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ABSTRACT  
 
This study examines the development of firm capital structures in European negative 
interest rate markets. This kind of new market phenomenon has not been occurred 
before in Europe, thus creating an intriguing opportunity to inspect empirically its 
effects on corporate leverage. One of the main goals of negative interest rates, by the 
central banks that have set it, is to promote bank lending to companies so they would 
invest more, hence creating a positive cycle in the economy. This is also one perspective 
in the study, and it is important to measure if these actions have really had the desired 
result.  
 
This paper covers the main previous theory and literature regarding trade-off and 
pecking order theories on capital structure. Aggregated deficit model is used to 
investigate pecking order theory, whereas conventional leverage model and dynamic 
partial adjusted model are used for trade-off theory. The data consists all listed public 
companies in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the 500 largest companies in the Euro 
area from year 2007 to 2015.  
 
The empirical results give mixed evidence regarding both pecking order and trade-off 
theory. Trade-off theory is better supported than pecking order theory considering fast 
adjustment to target leverage by the dynamic partial adjusted model and pecking order 
model not giving proper support for the after-mentioned. However, the evidence 
strongly supports that leverage started rising during the period of negative interest rates. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Capital Structure, Interest rate 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
It is widely agreed that corporation’s main purpose is to maximize its value and 
generate value for its shareholders. As a company seeks to fulfill this objective, it has to 
balance between different financing options while arranging its capital structure. There 
are countless factors affecting this structure, but the right choices can help the firm to 
decrease the cost of capital and survive in the market. Also, if we assume that cost of 
capital is tied into discounted future cash flows, it might have an effect on the present 
value of those flows and to the firm’s market value. For example, Niskanen and 
Niskanen (2000) describes that optimal capital structure means in theory an ideal ratio 
between equity and debt. A firm tries to maximize the benefits of debt, such as cheaper 
issuance cost and tax shield, while minimizing the disadvantages, such as bankruptcy 
costs. 
 
However, there are many competing theories for this optimal capital structure, and 
different theories emphasize different factors and priorities. Clear winner among the 
theories cannot be declared yet, and as financial field is ever changing and developing, 
it is interesting to try shed light on this controversial topic. The question: “What is 
corporate’s optimal capital structure?”, has been in the minds of researchers for over a 
half century. Nobel prize winners Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller are arguably 
one of the first and most influential researchers in the area of capital structure and whole 
finance theory. They claim in their paper of 1958 that in efficient markets, the 
composition of firm’s capital does not affect the value of the firm. This proposition is 
named after them as “Modigliani-Miller theorem” or “Capital structure irrelevance 
principle”. However, already in 1963 they made a correction to their original paper and 
argued that taxes actually cause an exception to their theorem, which leads debt to be 
the preferred choice over external equity.  
 
Modigliani and Miller (M&M) can be regarded as the founding fathers of modern 
capital structure research. Two other influential theories are trade-off and pecking order 
hypotheses. In 1973 Kraus and Litzenberger continued to improve M&M’s theorems by 
adding bankruptcy costs into the equation, giving a reason for the constraint for 
maximum debt, thus making it closer to the real life conditions. It would also mean that 
there can be some optimal leverage ratio, where the value of the company is the highest. 
Jensen and Meckling (1978) refined this even further by adding principal-agent problem 
into examination. Rajan and Zinglaes (1995) conducted a study finding many factors 
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that affect the capital structure, while Flannery and Rangan (2006) conducted a dynamic 
model to capture the adjustment of leverage in trade-off theory. 
 
Pecking order hypothesis by Myers and Majluf (1983) can be regarded as major 
competitor of trade-off theory. It assumes that there is crucial information asymmetry 
between the managers and investors in external debt and equity. This would cause 
internal financing to be the cheapest option, next debt and finally equity. Therefore, this 
theory assumes that current financing mix is only the result of financing decisions of the 
past. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) came up with up an empirical model using 
aggregated financial deficit variable to test this and found support for it. However, 
Frank and Goyal (2003) found evidence that does not support their findings. There are 
also newer theories, such as market timing hypothesis. Graham and Harvey (2001) find 
out that majority of CFOs confirm that the current stock price of the firm is an 
important factor when considering issuing new equity. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
confirm this in their study by finding out that firms issue more equity when their stock 
is overpriced.  
 
Macroeconomic factors may play a major role in capital structure decisions. Bhamara, 
Fisher and Kuehn (2011) show in their study that inflation and inflation expectations 
have an impact on corporate defaults. This would lead to higher bankruptcy risk, and 
thus decreasing the leverage by the trade-off theory. However, Abaidoo and Kwenin 
(2013) argue expected inflation affecting positively on firm performance and 
profitability. Europe has faced low inflation for several years now. For example, 
European Central Bank’s (ECB) main policy goal is to have inflation close to two 
percent. However, recently inflation has been far from the target, and ECB has been 
using low interest rates to boost the inflation. Ameer (2012) finds nominal interest rate, 
industrial production and initial IPO returns having significant relation to the number of 
IPOs. There are numerous studies regarding macroeconomic effects on stock markets, 
for example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that on average stock prices grow by 
one percent when FED cuts its target rate by 25-basis points without prior notice. Stock 
prices may affect firm capital structures as high potential gain from IPO can cause firms 
to prefer equity financing instead of debt, as found out in the market timing studies.  
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1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The subject of interest in this paper is to study the effect of the global financial crisis on 
capital structures and especially pay attention to the recent negative central bank interest 
rates and LIBOR in Europe. The purpose of monetary easing is to boost lending to 
corporations, which in turn should lead to increased investment activities by these 
corporations. This would generate more jobs and uplift the economy from the recession.  
 
Traditional corporate capital structure theories assume that cheap lending would lead to 
higher leverage by firms. However, the absence of profitable bond markets has caused a 
surge in equity markets. For example, market timing theory expects that firms should 
prioritize stock issuances in this kind of period. Therefore, the current low interest rate 
regime offers rather unique time-window to study corporate capital structures in 
European perspective. Financial and public utility firms will be left out in this study, as 
they have distinct incomparable capital structure compared to “normal” firms.  
 
 
1.2. Structure of the study 
 
Theory chapter will begin after this introduction chapter. It will cover the main theories 
regarding capital structure: it shall start with Modigliani and Miller theorem in order to 
understand the foundation of other theories. Next, trade-off theory will be covered with 
relating agency theory. Pecking order being the major competitor will be issued after, 
and these two theories will be discussed together. This thesis will mainly focus on these 
two theories in the empirical part too. Next the relevant empirical research will be 
discussed. 
 
I will go through the data and methodologies after the three first chaopters . All used 
regressions and hypotheses will be covered. Descriptive statistics shall be presented 
afterwards. Main factors affecting hypotheses will be covered and discussed. Finally, 
empirical results will be presented with analysis.  
12 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A corporate’s capital structure contains usually equity, debt and possibly some hybrid 
instruments mixing some characteristics of both equity and debt. Typically, firm issues 
equity or debt to finance its investments, thus permitting future growth and success of 
the company. Equity and debt have different costs and traits and neither is clearly 
superior to each other, otherwise both of them would not exist. The interest of 
researchers revolved around whether or not there is an optimal capital structure, which 
will maximize the value of the company, and does the choice and timing of financing 
tell something about the company.  
 
Equity and debt mainly differ from each other by the terms, how they must be paid back 
to the investors. Debt is a loan, which usually has interest payments as a steady flow of 
costs until it has been completely paid back to the lenders. However, interest is most 
often tax deductible, making it more appealing. Even though lender does not receive 
ownership rights over the company, there might be a mortgage or covenant constraining 
the firm. For example, a covenant might require the firm to upkeep some specific key 
ratios over the creditors pre-determined level. If this requirement is not met, the lender 
can have the right to raise the interest rate or even cancel the contract. High leverage 
also possesses a bankruptcy risk, because if company fails to meet its obligations to the 
creditors, they have the right to declare the company bankrupt and liquidate its assets to 
repay the debt.  
 
Equity can be split into internal and external equity. Internal equity is generated by 
firm’s own cash flow and therefore there are no major direct costs associated with it. 
Generally, after an equity issuance, the investors in external equity becomes an owner 
of the company and is thus eligible to receive part of the profit as dividend. Company is 
not obliged to pay dividend, but often an investor expects some dividends to earn return 
for the initial investment. The risk is higher when investing in external equity instead of 
debt, because in the case of bankruptcy, debt is paid back before equity. Therefore, an 
investor requires higher return from equity and financing through it might become more 
expensive for a company in the long run. 
 
This chapter will cover the two mainstream capital structure theories: trade-off and 
pecking order. Few other theories will be also discussed, which shall broaden the 
understanding of different motivations and motors that may drive the capital structure. 
The very first theory to be explained is Modigliani-Miller (M&M) theorem, which gives 
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the basis for many other capital structure theories. However, this theory is not really 
practical, as it has heavy assumptions that do not hold in the real life. Nevertheless, it is 
still crucial to understand this more theoretical and abstract framework, in order to 
measure and perceive violations in market efficiency and derive new theories that might 
reflect the real reasons and motivations behind capital structure. 
 
 
2.1. Modigliani-Miller theorem 
 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) capital structure irrelevancy theory can be regarded as 
the foundation of different capital structure theories. The presumptions for this are 
companies’ and individuals’ option to lend money for no risk and equal rate, no taxes, 
no transaction costs, perfect information symmetry and management’s willingness to 
maximize the value of the company. Their study proposes that all price differences 
stemming from the capital structure are exploited quickly by arbitrageurs in efficient 
capital markets. After these assumptions, Modigliani and Miller formed their two 
famous propositions. 
 
2.1.1. Modigliani-Miller theorem without taxes 
 
The proposition I claims that in a world without taxes, a change in a corporate’s capital 
structure does not have an effect on the firm’s value. One common way to explain this 
is to model the capital structure as a pie. No matter how you slice it, the total size or 
value does not change. If Modigliani and Miller’s presumptions are correct, it should 
matter if the company is financed by debt or equity, it should not have an effect on the 
firm’s ability to create revenue or profit, thus is should not either have an effect on its 
value. 
 
The proposition II claims that weighted average cost of capital (WACC) does not 
change when capital structure is altered. Figure 1. illustrates this and simple algebra 
proves it by solving the equation:  
 
 
1) 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝑒 ∗
𝐸
𝑉
+ 𝑟𝑑 ∗
𝐷
𝑉
 
 
(2) 𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟𝑎 + (𝑟𝑎 −  𝑟𝑑) ∗  
𝐷
𝐸
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2.1.2. Modigliani-Miller theorem with taxes 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find out that 45% of 392 surveyed CFOs agree that taxes 
influenced to their capital structure choices. When taxes are taken into account and all 
else equal, propositions I & II change (Modigliani & Miller 1963). Tax deductibility of 
interest payments will increase the value of the firm in theory, thus making debt more 
attractive option. Interest payments increase the free cash flow to the firm (FCFF) and 
measures the amount that can be paid back to the creditors and shareholders. Increasing 
FCFF will also increase the value of the company. Interest costs create a tax shield, 
which is behind the increasing FCFF. Therefore, if there would be no direct or indirect 
costs associated with high level of debt, such as bankruptcy costs, it would be optimal to 
have close to 100% debt ratio in theory. Table 1. Compares the FCFF of an unlevered 
and levered firm. 
 
Table 1. Calculating free cash flow to firm (FCFF). 
 Unlevered (U) Levered (L) 
EBIT 1000 1000 
Interest (10%)  100 
Taxable income 1000 900 
Taxes (20%) 200 180 
Net income 800 720 
FCFF 800 820 
Cost of capital 
Debt to equity ratio D/E 
𝑟𝑒 
WACC 
𝑟𝑑 
Figure 1. Weighted average cost of capital, 𝒓𝒆 = return on equity, 𝒓𝒅= return on debt,  
E = equity, D = debt, V = E + D. (Knüpfer & Puttonen 2009: 187.) 
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Table 1. shows that the annual tax shield in this example is: 100 * 20% = 20. Figure 2. 
portrays the growth of tax shield as debt ratio rises. If assumed that the company will 
keep the debt perpetual, the present value (PV) of the tax shield will be: 
 
(3) 𝑃𝑉 =
𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 (%)
=
20
0,1
= 200 
 
(4) 𝑃𝑉 =
𝐷∗𝑟𝑑∗𝑇𝑐
𝑟𝑑
= 𝐷 ∗ 𝑇𝑐 = 1000 ∗ 20% = 200 
 
 
Tax deductibility changes the second proposition too. An increasing in leverage will 
decrease WACC, as proved by formulas 5 and 6. Interest reduces the paid taxes, 
reducing WACC and this is shown in figure 3. Therefore, the optimal capital structure 
will be achieved at 100% debt ratio as already stated in the first proposition.  
 
 
(5) 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑟𝐴 = 𝑟𝐸 ∗
𝐸
𝑉
+ 𝑟𝐷 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝐶) ∗
𝐷
𝑉
 
 
6) 𝑟𝐸 = 𝑟𝐴 + (𝑟𝐴 − 𝑟𝐷) ∗
𝐷
𝐸
∗ (1 − 𝑇𝐶) 
 
 
𝑉𝑈 
Value of a firm 
Total debt (D) 
 
𝑉𝐿 = 𝑉𝑈 + 𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐷 
= value of a firm 
with debt 
 
𝑉𝑈 
𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐷 
Figure 2. Tax shield increases the value of a firm as total debt ratio raises. (Knüpfer & 
Puttonen 2009: 189.) 
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2.2. Trade-off theory 
 
Even though Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) propositions are good on paper, 
there are numerous costs, asymmetrical information and imperfect markets in practice. 
A perpetual bond is real financial instrument, but it is quite rare and generally debt is 
paid back to the creditors. Therefore, the leverage ratio is more likely to fluctuate. Also 
variation in a company’s revenues and profits can change its ability to carry debt. One 
of the well-known theories of capital structure is trade-off theory. It is mainly based on 
M&M’s propositions with taxes and bankruptcy costs taken into account. The name of 
this theory comes from the aim to optimize the value of a firm by trading off the 
benefits and costs of debt. (Kraus & Litzenberger 1973.) 
 
When a company cannot meet its obligations to creditors, there will usually occur so 
called financial distress costs. If the firm’s earnings before interests and taxes (EBITDA) 
to interest coverage ratio falls too low, it might trigger these financial distress costs, as 
creditor’s profit becomes riskier and thus, the lender might require risk premium for it. 
High debt ratio may cause the firm to be more vulnerable to firm specific and 
systematic risks, because EBITDA to interest coverage ratio becomes more sensitive. 
Figure 4. shows how the trade-off between the cost of distress and tax shield presents 
the optimal capital structure. For first, the benefit of tax shield out weights other costs, 
Cost of capital (%) 
𝐷
𝐸
 
𝑟𝐸 
𝑟𝑈 
WACC 
𝑟𝐷 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝐶) 
Figure 3. Weighted average cost of capital decreases as debt-to-equity ratio increases. 
(Knüpfer & Puttonen 2009: 188.) 
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but at the point when financial distress costs are more than the benefit of tax shield, the 
value of firm starts a downturn. Figure 4. demonstrates the market value of a firm is 
equal to the level of the unlevered firm (𝑉𝑈 ), plus the product of market value of the 
firm’s debt and the corporate tax rate, while subtracting the costs associated with 
bankruptcy risk.  Consequently, the optimal level of leverage can be reached at the point 
at which the slope of tax-shield plus bankruptcy costs reaches zero.  
 
 
Bankruptcy costs may be the most significant financial distress cost. It is a deadweight 
cost, which is not usually paid to anyone directly. When a firm defaults, its all assets are 
liquidated. The creditors are paid as well as possible, but often the assets are more 
valuable to the firm that is liquidated than to potential buyers. Therefore, there is a risk 
that creditors will not receive their share completely. Financial distress costs can variate 
depending, if the company limited or unlimited. In the case of unlimited company, the 
owners are liable for all the firm’s debt. Consequently, the financial distress cost is 
determined by owners’ solvency. If there are wealthy individuals sponsoring the 
company, the creditors can be more confident on the payback of debt, causing the risk 
premium to be smaller. However, in the case of limited liability, the stockholders can 
walk away from the company at bankruptcy and just leave it to creditors. If there are no-
one backing up the company, the lender might have to price the risk in the interest and 
covenants. In addition to chance of not getting back full payment, there are always some 
direct costs paid to lawyers, consultants and accountants. L. A. Weiss (1990) studied 
these direct costs in United States between 1980 and 1986. He found out large 
companies having average costs approximately 3% of book value of assets. On the other 
hand, these direct bankruptcy costs can absorb 20% to 40% of small companies’ assets 
Market value 
D/
𝑉𝑈 
PV tax shield (TS) 
PV TS + financial 
distress 
Optimal debt 
Figure 4. Market value and financial distress costs. (Knüpfer & Puttonen 2009: 189.) 
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(Franks & Sussman 2008). This might be obvious, because small companies have 
smaller total assets than larger companies. Hence, there is meaningful economy of scale 
in going bankrupt. 
 
When a firm is close to bankruptcy, there can be involved large indirect costs, which 
may push the firm into bankruptcy even if the company would not default in the first 
place. Business partners may start to question firm’s solvency and tighten payment 
terms. Employees might start to look out for a new firm and customers may lose their 
confidence. For example, they could start to avert the firm’s products, if they believe 
they will not receive spare parts or customer service in the future. (Brealey, Myers, 
Allen 2011: 478-480.) 
 
Trade-off theory can be split into two sub-theories: static and dynamic. Fischer, Heinkel 
and Zechner (1989) argued that the static trade-off model, which has only one optimal 
level of leverage, is too distant from the real world. Their empirical research found that 
companies did not have a constant debt ratio, thus making older models questionable. 
They introduced a dynamic model, which set an upper and a lower bound for the 
amount of debt. These limits are determined by tax-shield, costs associated with debt, 
interest rates and transactions costs of recapitalization. Fischer et al. (1989: 21) assumed: 
“A firm following an optimal financing policy offers a “fair” risk-adjusted rate of return 
to its investors. Then, assuming leverage being advantageous because of the tax-shield, 
unlevered firms must offer “below fair” risk adjusted rate-of-return.” An unlevered 
asset’s value expresses the possibility to lever them. Thus, in a no-arbitrage world, the 
difference between levered and unlevered firms’ value must be equal to the transaction 
costs related to the issuing of debt. The upper bound is determined by the level at which 
bankruptcy costs overweight the transaction costs of recapitalization, whereas the lower 
level is set by the point at which the benefit of the leverage is equal with its costs. 
 
Regardless of the popularity of trade-odd theory, there is a lot controversy within the 
theory. Studies show that small growth firms usually rely more on equity financing than 
debt. It is often a big investment heavy firm with large tangible assets that has high 
leverage. On the contrary, this is not constant either. Some large and successful 
companies strive with minimal debt, a way below its industry average. In fact, studies 
show that there is a negative correlation between debt and profitability. Especially firms 
with large intangible assets, for example some high tech companies, prefer equity over 
debt. Trade-off theory fails severely here, because high profits should mean the 
19 
 
capability to carry more debt, and to have a larger tax shield to protect the profits. 
(Fama & French 2002) 
The trade-off theory cannot explain either, why there has been debt before 20th century, 
because corporate tax was introduced in U.S. in 1909 with rate of 1%.  It means that 
before that and some decades after, there has not been any actual tax shield, which 
would justify using leverage by this theory. (Frank & Goyal 2008) 
 
 
2.3. Agency theory 
 
When trade-off theory is refined further and corporate governance is taken into account, 
we are introduced to agency theory of capital structure. Jensen & Meckling (1978) were 
first to study the principal-agent problem and capital structure together. This theory 
specifically takes deeper look into financial stress costs that originates from the conflict 
between a company’s management and its creditors & shareowners. This leads to the 
optimal capital structure, when tax shield minus financial stress & agency costs are at 
the highest.  
 
2.3.1. Principal-agent problem 
 
Agency relationship is a contract between principal(s) and agent(s), where principal 
delegates responsibility and decision making authority to the agent. The problem stems 
from the presumption that the both, principal and agent, are utility maximizers. 
Therefore, we can assume that some decisions can favor more the agent than the 
principal, which causes the agent to prefer and conduct those, if there were no 
restrictions. The problem is caused mostly from asymmetric information between these 
parties. Management has usually much more knowledge and inside information about 
the firm than owners and creditors as well as stakeholders cannot control and monitor 
everything that management does. Thus, principals should set incentives, which will 
prevent the management to deviate from their interests. (Jensen & Meckling 1978) 
 
The problem is not always between managements and stakeholders, but as well it can 
emerge between principals. Sometimes stockholders and creditors can have different 
interests. Stockholders’ goal is that the company maximizes their welfare. This requires 
usually risk taking into some extent, as from risk comes the reward. However, a rational 
stockowner has a large and well diversified portfolio, which minimizes firm-specific 
risk.. On the contrary, risk is a major factor for bondholders. They usually want to 
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minimize it, since they benefit only from the interest, which has been predetermined in 
the contact. They do not have any chance to benefit from additional risk, which only 
worsens the probability of loan and interest payback. This can lead to two kinds of 
problems. First is asset substitution problem, which means that for first company takes 
cheap debt to invest in safe project, but then decides to invest to riskier asset. The 
second is underinvestment problem, which is a kind of opposite of the earlier. This 
problem arises, when a company invests too safely or little, improving the creditors’ 
position at the expense of the owners. Dividend problem appears, when owners want to 
share out most of the profits, which leads the firm to weaker solvency and weakens 
creditor’s position. In addition, there can be differences between creditors. Old creditors 
can suffer from new debt, as they are priced their interest and willingness to take risk by 
the factors that were present before the new debt. Especially new debt can harm old 
bondholders, if the terms of new debt are on the same level with the old debt. This is 
called claim dilution problem. (Jensen & Meckling 1978; Niskanen 2000; Smith & 
Warner 1979) 
 
2.3.2. Agency costs 
 
Agency costs occur when managers do not maximize the value of a firm, and 
stakeholders’ monitoring and constraints cause costs. Morellec, Nikolov & Schürhoff 
(2012) predict that on average, the agency costs are 1.5% of total equity value, which 
would affect to leverage ratios. Maximizing value of a firm and finding all the most 
profitable projects can be tough and stressful. Therefore, at the lack of incentive, there 
can be a temptation for a manager to slack. Additionally, they can be tempted to waste 
firm’s money on their own private benefits. For example, buying corporate jets or 
scheduling business meetings in a fancy resort seldom increase the firm’s value. Failing 
project can hurt manager’s position and reputation. If there is no incentive for risk 
taking for managers, they probably start to prefer safer projects that can hinder the 
company’s growth. There is also chance of “empire building”, which means that 
company begins to acquire other companies, which increases the size of a company, 
instead of raising the profits (Baker & Kiymaz 2011). This benefits usually more 
managers by lifting their status, perks, reputation and compensation, but at the cost of 
efficiency and value of a company. To prevent this to happen, principals have to 
monitor and measure the firms and its managements’ performance, which also causes 
costs. 
21 
 
 
There legal and regulatory requirements, which reduce agency costs; it is managers’ 
duty to act responsibly and in the interest of owners. It is also prohibited to inside trade 
and these are monitored by the government and financial authority. Monitoring adds 
direct agency costs, because financial statements must be audited. Company wants to 
pass the audition, because otherwise auditor issues a qualified opinion, which means 
that everything is not right. This result is usually bad news for the firm and for its value. 
Lenders are also constantly monitoring the firm and issue covenants to protect their 
loans. Covenant usually demands the firm to maintain certain level of gearing. Breaking 
the covenant can result lender to call back the obligation, but it is more probable to just 
re-negotiate the terms of the debt, which results to higher interests.  (Jensen & Meckling 
1978; Fama & Jensen 1983) 
 
Board of Directors is elected by the shareholders, and their job is to keep eye of the 
management. Especially large institutional investors monitor firm performance closely 
and sometimes even demand their own representatives to join the board. Shareholders 
can also pressure the firm by just walking away from the company, which results fall in 
the firm’s value. Still the most common way to ensure managements incentive to 
maximize company’s value is stock options. This makes sure that management strives 
to add value, because otherwise the options would be worthless. However, there is still 
possibility that management just tries to pump up the stock with short term decisions, 
which could hurt the company in the long run. Therefore, as studies show, family firms 
succeed best on the long run, as their management owns a large portion of the firm and 
the firm is a kind of heritage that must be cherished. (Brealey et al. 2011; Jensen & 
Meckling 1978; Fama & Jensen 1983) 
Market value 
D/E 
 
𝑉𝑈 
PV tax shield 
PV financial distress 
Optimal debt 
Agency & financial 
distress costs 
 
Figure 5. Agency costs. (Niskanen & Niskanen 2000: 293.) 
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2.4. Pecking order theory 
 
This theory was mainly introduced by Myers & Majluf (1983), who were influenced by 
Donaldson’s study (1961), and it can be regarded as the major competitor of trade-off 
theory. There is no pre-set optimal capital structure by this theory. A company’s current 
debt ratio is just the result of accumulated financing decisions of the past. The name of 
the theory derives from an order of capital preference or hierarchy. Internal equity is the 
most preferable source, as there should be no direct costs associated with it when 
compared to debt with interest costs and external equity with dividends. Furthermore, 
raising external capital involves bureaucracy with the government’s regulators, which 
causes indirect costs. In addition to costs, the reason behind this order is information 
asymmetry between management and stakeholders, which means that managers know 
more about firm’s values, risks and prospects (Frank & Goyal 2008).  
 
In pecking order theory (POT) Internal financing is used first, because it is the cheapest 
choice; there are no interests or issuing costs.  Management has also more information 
than other parties. Therefore, they can spend the money more freely, as they do not have 
to explain the use of funds at the same detail as they would have to with debt or new 
stocks. The problem this brings is that same underinvestment problem as in agency 
theory. If there is no pressure, management may not put the maximum effort in finding 
the highest possible NPV projects, and may want to play too safe with investments, 
which might not be optimal for a firm’s value. However financial slack is valuable, 
because it allows a firm to invest easily, if a good investment opportunity appears.   
(Myers & Majluf 1983; Myers 1984.) 
 
When the firm faces a budget deficit and its internal funds are not enough to cover it, 
the following step would be cutting dividends. The firm could also sell some of its 
marketable securities to generate cash. When the company’s own means to generate 
financial slack have been used, the second step would be raising debt by POT. This step 
is before raising external equity, because interest payments are usually cheaper than a 
stock issuance and dividend payments. In addition to costs, new equity worsens the 
position of old owners as their voting power and chance to influence and monitor 
diminish.  (Myers & Majluf 1983; Myers 1984.) 
 
One major reason why equity is the last resort, in addition to costs, is again the 
asymmetric information between management and investors. If a mature firm attempts 
to sell stocks, a rational investor would think that the firm has used all of its financial 
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slack, plus the firm has already so remarkable financial stress costs that it could not 
raise any new debt. This may lead the asking price of stock to decrease along with the 
firm’s value, even if investors’ and analytics’ assumptions are wrong.  (Myers 1984.) 
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3. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Scholars have been arguing and comparing trade-off and pecking order theories to each 
other for a long time. Studies show that debt ratios are determined mostly by four 
factors. First factor is size. Large companies have often higher debt ratios. Second factor 
predicts that companies with high fixed assets to total assets tend to have higher debt 
ratios.  Third factor is profitability, which expects that well profitable companies have 
lower debt ratios. Fourth factor is market to book ratio (M/B), which predicts that high 
M/B is positively correlated with low debt ratio. (Fama & French 2002; Frank & Goyal 
2008; Rajan & Zingales 1995.) 
 
The first factor goes along well with trade-off theory, because large firms can usually 
afford to take more debt compared to smaller companies. One reason behind this could 
be financial stress costs. From the lender’s perspective, large companies tend to be more 
stable and they have more assets to use as securities, which also links to the second 
factor. On the other hand, Fama and French (2002) have some evidence that high 
investment ratio lessens the debt ratio, because of deprecation deduction acts as a tax 
shield instead of interest. Also small growth companies’ cash flow might be more 
volatile than large and mature firms’. Therefore, a period of cash flow could stress more 
high leveraged small firm than large firm, because of the probable lack of decent 
financial buffer. Large firms often have better access to public bond markets, which 
might also explain bigger debt ratio. If investment heavy small companies cannot rely 
so much on debt, they may have to resort more in external equity, which is against the 
second factor.  
 
In contrast to the first and second factor, the third goes along with pecking order theory. 
Highly profitable firms can choose to use internal financing instead of debt. High 
market to book ratio can be also regarded as measure of profitability (Rajan & Zingles 
1995). However, this is in complete contradiction with trade-off theory, which assumes 
that high profits should be protected with a tax shield that high debt ratio would provide. 
Large and profitable firms probably also follow pecking order, because they can 
prioritize the internal funding, but these can easily take debt if external financing is 
needed, leaving the option of external equity for the last resort. This can be figured out 
by the fact that large companies issue new stock less than smaller companies (Myers & 
Shyam-Sunder 1999). 
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3.1. Tactic and timing based theories of capital structure 
 
Studies show that there is some evidence relating to how current state in the markets 
links to the financing choice of a firm. This is called market timing hypothesis. An 
upward trend in the stock markets is called a bull market, whereas downward trend is 
called bear.  This theory predicts that during bull markets firms prefer external equity. 
On the contrary, when bear market hits, firms shift to debt. This can be related to 
behavioral corporate finance, as the moods of investors can determine the capital 
structure. Graham and Harvey (2001) find that two-thirds of CFOs agree that “the 
amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued was an important or very 
important consideration” when they are issuing equity. 
 
This theory is example of behavioral finance, because by contrast to other theories, it 
presumes that market is not efficient, and there is asymmetric information between 
management and investors. Baker and Wurgler (2002) explain in their study that during 
bull market, firm’s stock is overpriced. Therefore, as management knows the value of 
their stock better than investors, it would be wise to issue new equity during this period, 
as they would get higher price per share than normal. This supports Rajan and Zingales’ 
(1995) findings that firms with high market-to-book value have lower debt ratios. If 
firm issues equity when the price is high, it results to expansion of M/B ratio, and as 
they get abnormally good returns from it, the need of debt would probably shrink.   
 
On the other hand, if there is a bear market, firm’s stock may be underpriced. Then it 
would be better to raise debt, as the results with external equity financing would not be 
very effective. However, a forward looking company could benefit from this 
underpricing by stock repurchase. When firm’s stock is again overpriced, it can sell 
their repurchased stocks with profit. In addition, empirical evidence shows that stock 
repurchases are interpreted as good news by the markets, which leads on average to 2-3% 
increased abnormal returns (Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). 
(Baker & Wurgler 2002; Adams Bonaimé, Öztekin, Warr 2014.) 
 
Alti (2006) studied how initial public offerings (IPO) affected to the leverage of firms. 
Companies issue IPO when they first time list in a public stock market. He had 
separated firms to two groups based on the status of the market at the time they were 
listed. “Hot market” means that there are lots of IPOs happening during specific period, 
while in a “cold market” there are not many IPOs going. His results show that hot 
market firms get better price from the IPO, thus leading to lower debt-to-equity ratio. 
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Whereas cold market firms do not get as good price from their IPO, which leads to 
relatively higher D/E-ratio. However, the study predicts that the difference between the 
groups persists only two years, which after it vanishes.  
 
There could be at least two reasons behind the difference between hot and cold markets 
disappears in two years. One could be that a hot market firm starts to raise debt after 
IPO, as it is usually cheap, if the debt ratio is low. Other reason could be that during hot 
market, there can be a bubble present, or the stock at the IPO can be overpriced. After 
the bubble bursts or investors realize the stock’s real price, its value diminishes and D/E 
ratio adjusts with the cold group. Overall market timing theory has some problems, for 
example, why would some company issue debt during bull market and equity during 
bear. 
 
However, there is not always bull market during expansion and bear market during 
recession. Expansive monetary policies can boost stock prices. Because the yields from 
bonds are weak, stocks become relatively better in profit making. For example, after the 
financial crisis FED and ECB have used expansive monetary policies and kept low 
interest rates for a long period, as they have tried to keep financial markets stabile and 
especially the Euro Crisis has hindered the economic growth in Europe. Nevertheless, 
stock indexes have broken all time high records in the USA and Europe. 
(Chatziantoniou, Duffy and Filis 2013.) 
 
Asymmetric information is intertwined to almost every capital structure theory. 
However, signaling theory’s view point inspects how a firm’s financing behavior and 
capital structure sends information to outside investors, thus changing the value of the 
firm. It is very hard for investors to observe in the most accurate detail and calculate the 
value of all the marketed securities. Thus outsiders try to deduce the value of a firm by 
observable actions and characteristics, such as capital structure, debt, dividend and 
investment policies. (Kose 1987.) 
 
Management has often better understanding of firm’s value than outsiders have. 
Therefore, good quality firms should try to minimize the asymmetric information with 
investors, analytics and lenders, and prove that they are highly valued and trustworthy. 
This could be achieved by sending specific signals that separate themselves from lower 
quality firms. As stated earlier, small and volatile firms have higher financial stress 
costs. Therefore, large companies with good and steady profits could send positive 
signals by increasing leverage. Taking more debt implies that their bankruptcy costs are 
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not yet too high, which sends an image of good quality. This separates firms with good 
solvency from bad, because it is harder for the bad companies to raise more debt, and 
mimic the actions of the good companies. (Ross 1977; Krasker 1986.) 
 
Empirical evidence shows that issuing new external equity has an opposite effect 
compared to debt (Korwar & Masulis 1986). According to signaling theory, investors 
interpret that the firm has used its all debt holding capacity, when it raises new equity. 
Therefore, it is a sign of lower quality, which decreases the value of a firm (Ross 1977; 
Krasker 1986). Thus, this assumes pecking order theory to be in the background. Also, 
if investors believe that there is asymmetric information between the issuer and them, 
they can believe that the firm tries to take advantage of stock overpricing, as it was 
explained in market timing theory. Therefore, the value decreases as investors realize 
this. Additionally, voting power per share decreases, which could be also a direct reason 
behind the falling value.   
 
Stock repurchase is a strong factor in signaling theory, as it is in market timing theory. 
One of the reasons why these repurchases have caused abnormal returns, is that a firm 
sends a signal that it believes that the price of its stock is undervalued. When this signal 
is interpreted by outsiders, they react to this positively, and the value of the company 
should rise. However, stock repurchases are less attractive to execute, if the company’s 
stock is overpriced, as it makes the repurchasing expensive for the firm. Therefore, it is 
expected that overvalued firms avert and undervalued firms prefer repurchases.  Extra 
dividend is also a good signal, as it means that firm has surplus cash, and it directly 
raises the return and value of its stock. (Adams Bonaimé et al. 2014.) 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data of this study covers all the active publicly listed firms in European countries 
that have faced negative interest rates for the past few years (Euro area firms are limited 
to the 500 largest companies by market capitalization). Countries included are Denmark, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Euro area. Total number of firms is 841 and the period 
covered is from 2007 to 2015. This time period is chosen, because the subprime crisis or 
the beginning of financial crisis, caused the interest rates to decline dramatically due to 
central banks’ monetary policy easing, in order to boost the economies.  Lowering and 
even negative interest rates provide exciting opportunity to observe the developments of 
corporate capital structure, because interest rates are often tightly tied to the structure 
and to the theories concerning them.  
 
The company data is obtained from Orbis database. The common practice in capital 
structure studies is to exclude financial firms (6000-6999) and regulated utilities (4900-
4999) from the data, as the composition and drivers of their financial statements differ 
from “regular” companies. The measured interest rate in this study is 3-month LIBOR 
(London Interbank Offered rate) or equivalent, because it may be the best option to 
capture the cost of lending for a bank. It can be expected that in competitive lending 
markets, the bank’s marginal on top of LIBOR is approximately the same in the markets 
and for all companies. LIBOR does not either take into account firm specific risks, 
which may affect the margin, thus capturing the real direction of interest rate 
development over time. LIBOR is used for Swiss market and its data is obtained from 
The Swiss National Bank’s statistical database. STIBOR (Stockholm Interbank Offered 
Rate) is used with Swedish companies and it is published by NASDAQ. CIBOR 
(Copenhagen Interbank Offered Rate) is used with Danish companies and it is also 
published by NASDAQ. EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) is used for the Euro 
area companies and its data is obtained from the Bank of Finland. 
 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
I will start this section by describing the overall leverage characteristics of the listed 
companies in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the largest 500 firms in Euro area. 
Financials and utilities are excluded from the sample. The period spans from 2007 to 
2015 and it is divided into four sub samples: first 2007-2009, second 2010-2012, third 
2013-2015 and fourth 2007-2015 (total). First period covers the global financial crisis, 
29 
 
second can be regarded as the period of European sovereign debt crisis and last period 
considers the time of near zero to negative interest rates. All the factors are measured in 
book values instead of market values, because market value may yield biased and 
distorted results. For example, if market based debt to total assets ratio shrinks, it can be 
hard to measure if the value of assets have increased or if the level of debt has decreased. 
Therefore, book value reflects the financing decisions more clearly.  
 
Table 3 investigates three different measures of leverage: total debt (long-term + short-
term) to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to capital (equity + total 
debt). Total debt to total assets is relatively common and easy way to measure the 
leverage of firm. Total debt does not include relatively irrelevant liabilities such as 
untaxed reserves or accounts payable, which makes is good measure of financing 
decisions relating to debt. Long-term debt reflects the future investments and 
expectations better than total debt. Using capital instead of total assets as denominator 
helps to clear out all the non-financing decision related accounts, thus probably making 
it the best factor measuring the past financing decisions of a firm. 
 
 
Table 2. Mean and median values of total debt to totals assets, long-term debt to total assets and 
total debt to capital (shareholder equity + debt) of listed companies in Denmark, Sweden, 
Switzerland and top 500 Euro area in 2007-2015.  Unbalanced data is used with financial and 
general utility companies excluded from the sample. 
Denmark 
Year   2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Total debt/ Mean 0,46 254 0,52 273 0,47 276 0,49 803 
Total assets Median 0,46   0,46   0,43   0,45   
Long-term debt/ Mean 0,14 254 0,15 273 0,15 276 0,14 803 
Total assets Median 0,08   0,09   0,08   0,09   
Total debt/ Mean 0,78 254 0,78 273 0,79 276 0,78 803 
Capital Median 0,87   0,86   0,88   0,87   
                  
  
 
 
Euro500 
Year   2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Total debt/ Mean 0,56 1063 0,55 1126 0,55 1182 0,55 3371 
Total assets Median 0,56   0,55   0,54   0,55   
Long-term debt/ Mean 0,21 1063 0,20 1126 0,21 1182 0,20 3371 
Total assets Median 0,19   0,19   0,18   0,19   
Total debt/ Mean 0,91 1063 0,92 1126 0,92 1182 0,92 3371 
Capital Median 0,95   0,95   0,95   0,95   
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Sweden 
Year   2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Total debt/ Mean 0,45 884 0,45 1022 0,45 1268 0,45 3174 
Total assets Median 0,44   0,45   0,44   0,45   
Long-term debt/ Mean 0,12 884 0,12 1022 0,11 1268 0,12 3174 
Total assets Median 0,05   0,05   0,04   0,05   
Total debt/ Mean 0,79 884 0,79 1022 0,80 1268 0,80 3174 
Capital Median 0,89   0,89   0,90   0,90   
                    
Switzerland 
Year   2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Total debt/ Mean 0,39 425 0,40 455 0,41 466 0,40 1346 
Total assets Median 0,40   0,39   0,39   0,39   
Long-term debt/ Mean 0,11 425 0,13 455 0,13 466 0,12 1346 
Total assets Median 0,06   0,08   0,09   0,07   
Total debt/ Mean 0,85 425 0,85 455 0,84 466 0,85 1346 
Capital Median 0,92   0,93   0,94   0,93   
                    
All countries 
Year   2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Total debt/ Mean 0,48 2626 0,49 2876 0,48 3192 0,48 8694 
Total assets Median 0,49   0,49   0,48   0,48   
Long-term debt/ Mean 0,15 2626 0,16 2876 0,15 3192 0,15 8694 
Total assets Median 0,12   0,12   0,12   0,12   
Total debt/ Mean 0,85 2626 0,85 2876 0,85 3192 0,85 8694 
Capital Median 0,92   0,93   0,93   0,93   
 
 
Table 3 shows that the ratios stay almost constant over the period. This supports mostly 
static trade-off theory, where the leverage stays at optimal, defined level. Majority of 
the ratios vary by only one percentage point. The biggest change can be observed in 
Danish companies mean total debt to total assets ratio, where it increases by 6 
percentage points from 0,46 to 0,52 and then decreases to 0,47, which is close to the 
starting point. Considering the fact that interest rates have gone down significantly over 
the whole period, the table does not suggest that firms would have changed their 
leverage because of it. 
 
The factors are relatively close between Denmark and Sweden. They have larger debt to 
total assets ratio than Switzerland, which in turn has larger debt to capital ratio. This 
suggests that Swiss companies rely relatively less on equity financing that Danish and 
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Swedish. However, they all have smaller ratios in every factor than Euro500, which 
means that they are less leveraged and may have better buffer against financial distress 
than European average. 
 
Table 4 displays the averages of key variables in pecking order testing. The data and 
table is divided into countries and three different time periods as was the table 3. Δ 
stands for change from year t-1 to t.  
 
 
Table 3. Average of key variables as a fraction of total assets (book value) over 2007-2015 and 
three sub periods. Results are gathered from unbalanced data, with financials and utilities 
excluded from the sample.  
Denmark 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Cash dividends 0,026 176 0,030 171 0,062 155 0,038 502 
Investments 0,072 253 0,031 275 0,037 289 0,046 817 
Δ Working capital -0,023 170 0,108 284 -0,003 299 0,034 753 
Cash flow 0,036 254 -0,044 283 0,028 288 0,006 825 
Deficit 0,039 254 0,200 284 0,037 299 0,093 837 
Δ Debt 0,006 170 -0,017 284 -0,017 299 -0,012 753 
Δ Equity 0,009 170 -0,022 284 -0,019 299 -0,014 753 
                  
Euro500 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Cash dividends 0,027 797 0,021 867 0,022 987 0,023 2651 
Investments 0,073 869 0,058 944 0,053 1110 0,061 2923 
Δ Working capital -0,012 714 0,004 1129 0,002 1184 -0,001 3027 
Cash flow 0,084 1059 0,079 1125 0,076 1171 0,079 3355 
Deficit -0,012 1066 -0,010 1129 -0,005 1184 -0,009 3379 
Δ Debt 0,013 714 -0,002 1129 -0,004 1184 0,001 3027 
Δ Equity 0,001 714 0,000 1129 -0,001 1184 -0,001 3027 
 
Sweden 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Cash dividends 0,044 417 0,069 494 0,051 515 0,055 1426 
Investments 0,079 741 0,088 879 0,075 1164 0,080 2784 
Δ Working capital 0,026 606 0,012 1135 0,001 1508 0,009 3249 
Cash flow -0,084 873 -0,061 1086 -0,095 1402 -0,081 3361 
Deficit 0,185 898 0,169 1135 0,164 1508 0,171 3541 
Δ Debt -0,002 606 0,000 1135 -0,011 1508 -0,005 3249 
Δ Equity 0,001 606 0,004 1135 -0,024 1508 -0,010 3249 
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Switzerland 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Cash dividends 0,028 271 0,031 321 0,036 360 0,032 952 
Investments 0,056 362 0,054 421 0,053 451 0,054 1234 
Δ Working capital -0,014 287 0,094 456 0,005 466 0,034 1209 
Cash flow 0,077 415 0,020 445 0,062 452 0,053 1312 
Deficit -0,019 426 0,147 456 0,024 466 0,052 1348 
Δ Debt 0,000 287 0,008 456 -0,003 466 0,002 1209 
Δ Equity -0,006 287 0,011 456 0,003 466 0,004 1209 
                  
All countries 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Cash dividends 0,032 1661 0,036 1853 0,035 2017 0,034 5531 
Investments 0,072 2225 0,065 2519 0,060 3014 0,065 7758 
Δ Working capital 0,000 1777 0,031 3004 0,001 3457 0,012 8238 
Cash flow 0,022 2601 0,007 2939 -0,002 3313 0,008 8853 
Deficit 0,059 2644 0,101 3004 0,076 3457 0,079 9105 
Δ Debt 0,005 1777 -0,001 3004 -0,008 3457 -0,003 8238 
Δ Equity 0,001 1777 0,001 3004 -0,012 3457 -0,005 8238 
 
 
Firms have increased their dividends in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland but 
decreased in Euro500 over the whole period. Danish companies have approximately 
increased their dividends by 150% from 0,026 to 0,062, while in Euro500 firms have 
decreased them from 0,027 to 0,022. Money used in investments has relatively 
decreased in every market, which may indicate that companies have favored distributing 
wealth back to shareholders instead of growing the company by funding new 
investments. Reason behind this can be numerous, for example lack of demand and 
insecure market situation.  
 
Change in working capital was negative in every market expect in Sweden during 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, which tells of reducing operational efficiency. After the 
crisis in 2010-2012 the value rallied across the board and in the recent years of 2013-
2015 it toned down and in Denmark it even turned negative again. Cash flow has 
remained mainly positive in every market expect in Sweden, where it has remained 
negative during the whole period.  
 
Companies have faced financial deficit in every market during the whole time, except 
Euro500, where it has been negative in the period. Deficit and change of debt should 
have same signs and level, if the first hypothesis, a firm financing financial deficit my 
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same amount of debt, holds. Firm can also choose to finance deficit with equity and the 
change of equity expresses the difference between new stocks issued minus repurchases. 
Descriptive statistics show that Danish firms issued new shares in 2007-2009 but 
focused more on repurchases during 2010-2015. Change of equity has remained rather 
stable in Euro500. Swedish companies issued new shares from 2007 to 2012 but started 
to repurchase during 2013 to 2015 on average. On the contrary, Swiss firms repurchased 
during 2007 to 2009 and then started to issue new stocks in the later period. 
 
Table 5 describes the mean values of variables relevant to the conventional mode of 
leverage testing, which is also often used to test trade-off theory, as for example Rajan 
and Zinglaes (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2003) conducted in their studies. These 
factors describe the general characteristics of firms, mainly the composition of assets, 
firm growth potential, size and profitability, which all have been normalized and 
comparable by dividing them by total assets. This table also shows the LIBOR 
equivalent interest rate in the respective countries.  
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of conventional model of leverage testing. Values represent 
averages of variables in the investigated time frames. Excluded sectors are financials and 
utilities. Tangibility = tangible fixed assets / total assets; Market-to-book = market capitalization 
/ total assets; Sales = turnover / total assets; Profitability = profit before taxes / total assets; 
Interest rate = LIBOR equivalent in the respecting country. 
Denmark 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Tangibility 0,30 254 0,28 284 0,26 298 0,28 836 
Market-to-book 1,30 225 1,14 254 1,75 272 1,41 751 
Sales 1,05 254 1,05 278 1,05 287 1,05 819 
Profitability -0,01 254 -0,09 284 -0,03 299 -0,04 837 
Interest rate 3,69% 303 0,83% 303 0,15% 303 1,56% 909 
 
    
 
        
  
 
Euro500 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Tangibility 0,25 1066 0,24 1129 0,23 1184 0,24 3379 
Market-to-book 0,70 972 0,67 1004 0,84 1119 0,74 3095 
Sales 1,04 1063 1,01 1126 1,01 1181 1,02 3370 
Profitability 0,06 1066 0,05 1129 0,05 1184 0,05 3379 
Interest rate 2,76% 1191 0,85% 1191 0,08% 1191 1,23% 3573 
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Sweden 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Tangibility 0,14 897 0,13 1121 0,11 1487 0,12 3505 
Market-to-book 1,91 572 1,54 774 1,97 841 1,80 2187 
Sales 1,05 866 1,05 1092 0,97 1432 1,01 3390 
Profitability -0,12 898 -0,13 1135 -0,16 1508 -0,14 3541 
Interest rate 2,74% 1596 2,15% 1596 0,27% 1596 1,72% 4788 
                  
Switzerland 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Tangibility 0,25 425 0,25 456 0,25 466 0,25 1347 
Market-to-book 1,15 382 1,11 420 1,49 439 1,26 1241 
Sales 1,04 424 1,00 447 1,00 461 1,01 1332 
Profitability 0,04 426 -0,02 456 0,03 466 0,02 1348 
Interest rate 1,22% 501 0,08% 501 -0,27% 501 0,35% 1503 
                  
All countries 
Year 2007-2009 obs. 2010-2012 obs. 2013-2015 obs. Total obs. 
Tangibility 0,22 2642 0,20 2990 0,19 3435 0,20 9067 
Market-to-book 1,16 2151 1,07 2452 1,40 2671 1,22 7274 
Sales 1,04 2607 1,03 2943 1,00 3361 1,02 8911 
Profitability -0,01 2644 -0,04 3004 -0,05 3457 -0,04 9105 
Interest rate 2,62% 3576 1,32% 3576 0,12% 3576 1,35% 10728 
 
 
Tangible fixed assets are often machinery, buildings, factors and other concrete 
investments and projects. This value has decreased in every market, excluding 
Switzerland, from 2007 to 2015. There can be two reasons behind this. The first is that 
companies have invested less in these assets; therefore the value has decreased with 
depreciations. The other reason could be that total assets have relatively increased. 
Table 4 supports the first explanation, as the level of investments has gone down in the 
same period.  If compared to the interest rate, it seems that reducing interest rate has not 
increased real investments, if tangible assets can be regarded as such. 
 
Market-to-book measures the market capitalization of firm (stock price multiplied by 
the amount of stocks outstanding) divided by the book value of the company (total 
assets). Usually market price reflects the value of a company and its growth and return 
potential for an investor. For example, the change of market-to-book value seems to be 
much more volatile than profit ratio by the table. If we assume that profits are relatively 
stationary on average, then we can conduct that change in market-to-book is most likely 
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to be driven by the stock price and not by the book value of assets. The decline of 
market-to-book ratio from 2007-2009 to 2010-2012 could be explained by the financial 
crisis and country and system wide plummeting stock markets. In 2013 to 2015 stock 
markets have rallied again and if market-to-book is used as a proxy for stock market 
movement, we can infer that stock markets have returned on growth track, as well as 
investors believe in the markets again. One reason behind increased stock prices can be 
relative unattractiveness of interest based bond markets, which is caused by low interest 
rates.  
 
Company sales to total assets have remained relatively stable, although there has been 
some decline over the period. Only in Denmark the ratio has remained constant over the 
time. Euro500 and Switzerland faced drop after 2007-2009, whereas Sweden faced drop 
in 2013-2015. Profitability results look interesting in Denmark and Sweden, because 
they have been negative on average during the whole period. Especially in Sweden the 
ratio has declined from -12% to -16% of total assets, which does not look good on long-
run. Declined sales can be one reason behind this. Only in Euro500 the profitability has 
remained stable on positive in every period. Swiss firms had a drop during 2010-2012 
but recovered afterwards.  
 
Interest rates declined in every country within the data. Swiss LIBOR was negative on 
average already in 2013-2015. Every country faced negative market rate latest in 2015, 
whereas local central bank rates were already negative few years before that. In 
Denmark’s central bank’s deposit rate hit negative rate first time in July 2012 
(Danmarks Nationalbanken 2016). Erupean Central Bank’s overnight deposit rate 
turned negative in June 2014 (European Central Bank 2016). Swedish deposit rate 
changed to negative in July 2014, although it dipped momentarily under zero in 2010 
(Riksbank 2016) Swiss deposit rate (SARON) stayed around zero, touching negative 
side in 2012 and 2013, but turning decisively negative in January 2015 (Swiss National 
Bank 2016). Table 6 has detailed view on the rates by year and figure 5 show 
graphically the development of the rates over time. 
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Table 5. Yearly overnight interest rates as they were in 31. December by the year, country and 
its currency. DNB = Danmarks Nationalbanken; ECB = European Central Bank; RB = 
Riksbank; SNB = Swiss National Bank; Deposit rate = central bank’s deposit rate; CIBOR = 
Copenhagen Interbank Offered rate; EURIBOR = Euro Interbank Offered Rate; STIBOR = 
Stockholm Interbank Offered Rate; LIBOR = London Interbank Offered Rate. 
  DNB ECB RB SNB 
  Deposit rate CIBOR Deposit rate EURIBOR Deposit rate STIBOR Deposit rate LIBOR 
2007 4,25 4,61 3,00 4,68 2,71 4,75 2,31 2,76 
2008 3,75 4,91 2,00 2,89 3,39 2,55 0,25 0,66 
2009 1,15 1,55 0,25 0,70 0,08 0,90 0,10 0,25 
2010 0,70 1,21 0,25 1,01 -0,12 2,22 0,30 0,17 
2011 0,40 1,00 0,25 1,36 1,01 2,76 0,08 0,05 
2012 -0,20 0,28 0,00 0,19 0,71 1,47 -0,08 0,01 
2013 -0,10 0,26 0,00 0,29 0,24 0,94 -0,05 0,02 
2014 -0,05 0,28 −0,10 0,08 -0,29 0,26 0,03 -0,06 
2015 -0,75 -0,09 −0,30 -0,13 -1,00 -0,40 -0,73 -0,76 
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Figure 6. These two graphs plot the development of Denmark’s (DNB), Euro area’s (ECB), 
Sweden’s (RB) and Switzerland’s (SNB) interest rates from 2007 to 2015. Picture on the top 
shows the change of central bank deposit rates, and the bottom picture shows the change of 
LIBOR equivalent interest rates over the time period.  
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4.2. Hypotheses and methodologies  
 
I will test the two most common theories within capital structure studies with the before 
mentioned data. These are pecking order and trade-off theory. I shall start with testing 
pecking order theory in the footsteps of Shyam-Sunders and Meyers (1999) and Frank 
and Goyal (2003).  
 
3.1.1. Testing pecking order theory 
 
To test the theory, they constructed a model to measure the relationship of financial 
deficit to change in debt. The theory suggests that the deficit should be covered with 
equity only in the extreme conditions and normally the deficit should be funded by debt, 
if internal financing is not sufficient. For this, we define the required variables as follow: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡  = cash dividends in year t; 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡  = net investment in year t; 
Δ𝑊𝐶𝑡  = change in working capital in year t; 
𝐶𝐹𝑡  = cash flow in year t; 
Δ𝐷𝑡  = change in net debt in year t; 
Δ𝐸𝑡  = change in share capital in year t (issues – repurchases of shares). 
 
Financial deficit is calculated by summing the outgoing flow of funds and subtracting 
the incoming funds: 
 
(1)   𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + Δ𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 - 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + Δ𝐸𝑖,𝑡. 
 
Using this equation, we can create a regression model to capture the relationship of 
deficit and change in net debt: 
 
(2) Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝑃𝑂 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where α is constant and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is error term. We can construct the first hypothesis by 
expecting that firms follow pecking order hypothesis. Therefore, a financial deficit is 
completely financed by debt, which means that the coefficient of deficit (𝛽𝑃𝑂)  should 
be equal to one: 
 
H1: 𝛽𝑃𝑂 = 1. 
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To check whether or not the aggregation of deficit variable is justified, we can run the 
regression 2. in disaggregated form: 
 
(3) Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑊𝐶Δ𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
 
An increase of unit in any component of 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 should have identical effect on Δ𝐷𝑡. So, 
a growth in dividends, investments or working capital should increase debt by the same 
amount, whereas rise in cash flow should decrease the need for debt by the equivalent 
number.  Hence, the second hypothesis expects that the coefficients of these variables 
equal one: 
 
H2: 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉 = 𝛽𝑊𝐶 = 𝛽𝐶𝐹 = 1. 
 
 
3.1.2. Static trade-off theory and conventional leverage testing 
 
According to the trade-off theory, there is one optimal level of debt for each company, 
which they strive to reach and maintain. By obtaining this target level of debt, the firms 
have achieved the optimal capital structure. Many empirical studies on capital structure 
and trade-off theory list variables that might have an effect on it. Harris and Raviv 
(1991) observe in their study that important determinants are: fixed assets, non-debt tax 
shields, investment opportunities, firm size, earnings volatility, default risk, profitability, 
advertising expenditures and research & development expenditures.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) empirical study in G-7 countries found out that the most 
important factors affecting capital structure are size, tangible assets, profitability and 
market-to-book-ratio. These same factors have also been raised into importance by 
Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003, 2008). As this study’s data 
considers similar developed countries as the researchers in their studies mentioned 
before, it is highly likely, that those same factors play important role in this sample too. 
I will follow the conventional model presented by the researchers before, with adding 
interest rate as a new variable.  
 
The conventional leverage regression tries to explain the level of debt and this is used to 
justify the trade-off theory and can be used as a robustness check for pecking order 
theory. The regression used in this study is: 
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(3) Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡  = α + 𝛽𝑇  Δ𝑇𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽𝑀𝑇𝐵  𝛥𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽𝐿𝑆  𝛥𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃  𝛥𝑃𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐹  𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽𝐼  𝐼𝑖,𝑡  +     
µ𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
 
Hypotheses are concluded in table 2 and new variables in regression 3 are as follow: 
 
𝛥𝑇𝑖,𝑡   = tangible assets’ first difference between years; 
𝛥𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  = market-to-book ratio’s first difference between years; 
𝛥𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = logarithm of sales’ first difference between years; 
𝛥𝑃𝑖,𝑡  = profitability’s first difference between years; 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡   = local LIBOR equivalent in year t, 
µ𝑖   = unobserved firm fixed effect. 
 
In terms of pecking order theory argued by Harris and Raviv (1991), firms with high 
level of tangible assets should have low asymmetric information, thus allowing more 
successful equity financing. Vice versa, low level of tangible assets creates high 
asymmetric information, which would force companies to prioritize debt. However, as 
pecking order theory priorities debt over equity, high tangibility supports high leverage 
as tangible assets serve well as collateral for the debt. Thus, the role of tangibility can be 
interpreted by two ways.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that tangibility is significant 
factor regarding trade-off theory. Tangible assets serve as natural collateral for debt, 
thus allowing higher gearing. One of the main reasons to create collateral is to reduce 
information asymmetry. Therefore, it also reduces financial distress costs and raises the 
maximum potential level of debt by trade-off theory. On the other hand, Fama and 
French (2002) find evidence that high investment ratio, which can be tied to tangible 
assets, reduces the dependency on debt, because of depreciation serving as tax shield. 
 
Market-to-book ratio is often viewed as a measure of company’s future growth 
prospects. Frank and Goyal (2003) claim that real growth usually requires investments.  
Pecking order theory expects that investments are financed as debt before equity, thus 
assumes positive relationship between market-to-book ratio and debt. Myers (1977) 
argued that growth firms should not be highly leveraged, because it could limit the 
ability to raise debt when needed to secure the necessary investments for the growth. 
Because of high financial distress cost of debt and its hindrance on future growth, trade-
off theory expects negative relationship between market-to-book ratio and debt ratio. 
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Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue and confirm in their study that larger companies are 
relatively higher leveraged. For example default risk is lower for a large company than 
for a small one. Large firms are often also older, their stock is more liquid, and they are 
under vigilant eye of rating agencies, stock analysts and the public. These factors 
attribute to lower information asymmetry and financial distress costs. This supports the 
positive relationship between size and debt and also trade-off theory. Pecking order 
theory is also supported by this relationship, because the main reason between different 
choices of financing lies on information asymmetry. Bond and debt markets may not be 
willing to provide the required financing for a small company, as they can be more 
opaque. Thus, it lessens the potential debt ratio, and it is common that small companies 
(which are also often growth companies) are forced to rely relatively more on external 
equity financing.  
 
Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003, 2007) find that there is often 
negative relationship with weak explanatory power between profitability and leverage. 
This find is consistent with pecking order theory. Highly profitable firms have higher 
cash flow and possess good starting point to use internal financing in their investment 
projects. High cash flow decreases financial deficit and if the cash flow is greater than 
deficit, it directly decreases the debt ratio of a company as proposed in the second 
formula and financial surplus allows larger amortizing of debt, instead of accruing it.  
 
Trade-off theory suggests the total opposite. Well profitable firms should use debt to 
create a tax-shield over the profits. Furthermore, if the profitability is stationary, so it 
stays relatively constant over time, it can also reduce financial distress costs and 
increase the potential leverage as a result. Deficit can be seen as an opposite of 
profitability. High deficit can mean that the firm is forced to lend, which would increase 
the financial distress costs. It may also imply that there are no high profits to cover with 
the tax shield. Thus I expect negative relationship between deficit and trade-off theory. 
Agency theory supports the positive relationship between profitability and debt too. 
High cash flow can make the managers more careless in the use of the funds. Therefore, 
debt with collaterals and monitoring from the outside can cause the managers to stay 
better in line. 
 
Market timing theories can be regarded to be more focused on equity side of capital 
structure. Important determinant is the price of the share and the market condition 
(“bull/bear”). These have an effect on capital structure by issuing new stocks when the 
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value of company’s stock is overpriced and repurchasing when it is underpriced. 
However, could debt be underpriced too? As it is common for firms to have debt, it 
would be wise to time the loaning when it is affordable. Low rates decrease financial 
distress costs too. Trade-off theory also claims that during period of low interest rates, 
ceteris paribus, firms should increase their level of debt to keep stable tax-shield. Low 
interest rate favors debt over equity, and thus it supports also pecking order theory. The 
major target behind the monetary policy tool of lowering interest rates is to boost the 
economy to increase the level of corporate debt, so they could invest and spend more. 
All these factors support the expectation of negative relationship between interest rate 
and leverage. 
 
 
Table 6. Hypotheses (H3) regarding conventional capital structure regression. 
Factor β Pecking order theory Trade-off theory 
Tangibility +/- + 
Growth + - 
Size + + 
Profitability - + 
Deficit + - 
Interest rate - - 
 
 
3.1.3. Testing leverage with dynamic trade-off theory 
 
Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) argued that the static or traditional trade-off theory, 
which sets only one optimal level of debt, is too far away from the real world. Their 
empirical research indicates that companies do not have constant debt ratio, which 
weakens the power of static model. They introduced a dynamic model, which sets an 
upper and a lower bound for the debt ratio. These limits are determined by the benefit of 
tax-shield, interest rates, transaction costs of recapitalization and other direct and 
indirect costs associated with debt.  
 
Fischer et al. assume that a company following an optimal financing policy offers a 
“fair” risk-adjusted rate of return to its investors. Assuming leverage being 
advantageous because of the tax-shield, unlevered firms must offer “below fair” risk-
adjusted rate of return. Thus, an unlevered firm’s asset’s value reflects the potential to 
lever it. In a non-arbitrage situation, the difference between levered and unlevered firms’ 
values must be equal to the transaction costs of debt. This is because it should not 
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matter, whether the company or the investor uses leverage. The upper bound is 
determined by the level at which financial distress costs overweight the transaction 
costs of recapitalization, whereas the lower level is set by the point where the benefit of 
the leverage is equal with its costs. 
 
The cyclical nature of individual businesses, countries and the world’s economy can 
cause disturbances to the optimal level of debt. In addition to the upper and lower limits, 
there might be some long term mean and reversion to the mean caused by the 
disturbances. Dynamic trade-off theory allows time variance and reversion to the mean. 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) investigate long-run capital structures and the speed of 
adjustment of U.S. firms. First in formula (4), the target leverage ratio as 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∗ , with 
𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 defining the characteristics affecting it. Next, the standard partial adjustment 
model is given in formula (5). Finally, substituting (4) into (5) creates dynamic partial 
adjusted model of leverage (6): 
 
(4) 𝐷𝑖,
∗= 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
(5) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 - 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 = λ(𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∗  - 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(6) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = (𝜆𝛽)𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + (1-λ)𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + µ𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
 
λ is the adjustment speed coefficient, µ𝑖 is a time-invariant unobserved variable (firm 
fixed effect) and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. Flannery and Rangan expects all firms having the 
same adjustment speed to eliminate the deviation from the long-run mean. The 
difference between the current and previous debt ratio increases by λ, if the current 
deviation from the target debt ratio has marginally increased. λ = 0 means that the speed 
of adjustment is zero and it does not adjust at all, whereas λ = 1 indicates that the 
adjustment is instant and that the leverage is always at its target level. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 represents 
the lagged company characteristics and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1  is the lagged level of debt, which are 
scaled by total assets. In addition to equation 4, I will create another regression by 
adding lagged interest rate 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 as an independent variable. This factor will capture the 
influence of interest rate to the adjustment speed: 
 
(7) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = (𝜆𝛽)𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + (1-λ)𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛾𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
 
I assume that in developed markets, high interest rate indicates good macroeconomic 
condition, which would suggest less financial constraints for firms on average. Thus, I 
expect that the adjustment speed is higher in the equation seven than in equation six.  
43 
 
Also, the relationship between interest rate and debt should stay negative as it was 
hypothesized in the conventional model:  
 
H4:  𝜆7 < 𝜆6; γ < 0.  
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter shows and describes the results of empirical analysis and regressions. For 
first, both aggregated and disaggregated models of pecking order theory are first gone 
through. The second part consists of static and dynamic trade-off models. The results 
are divided by the market or country and by different time periods. As stated in previous 
chapter, the markets consist of all listed public companies in Denmark, Sweden, 
Switzerland and top 500 firms in European Monetary Union (Euro 500). Time period is 
from 2007 to 2015, with three sub-sections: 2007-2009 marking financial crisis, 2010-
2012 for European sovereign debt crisis and 2013-2015 depicting adjustment into 
negative interest rates. Panels are unbalanced, because for example all companies have 
not paid dividends in every year and including all firms in the data gives more robust 
results because of diminishing survivorship bias. If not stated otherwise, firm fixed 
effects are used in the panel regressions, because the chosen firms are specifically 
selected (public listed companies versus completely random sample of companies). 
Independent variables are scaled with total assets and interest rate is measured in 
percent form, so that the coefficient of interest rate variable denotes the change in 
dependent variable, if the interest rate changes by one percentage point. Using decimals 
gives otherwise identical results, but the coefficients are only multiplied by a hundred.  
 
 
5.1. Pecking order theory tests 
 
Table 7 shows the results of testing pecking order theory, with deficit independent 
variable in an aggregated from and change of net debt as dependent variable The 
hypothesis expects that financial deficit of the company (dividends + investments + 
change in working capital – cash flow) should be completely financed by debt, thus, the 
coefficient of financial deficit should be one. If the hypothesis does not hold, it implies 
that firms have been using other sources of financing instead of debt, which is mainly 
external equity by the theory. 
 
The results in table 7 are mainly highly statistically significant. However, the DEF’s 
coefficient for whole sample is only 0,08 with 𝑅2 0,19. The coefficient is 0,13 during 2007-
2009, changing to 0,04 in 2010-2012 and to 0,20 in 2013-2015. These results do not support 
pecking order hypothesis, because the figures are far from unity. Nevertheless, the use of debt 
seems to be highest in the period of near zero and negative interest rates, supporting the 
motivation of studying the relationship between the negative rates and capital structure. 
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Especially in Denmark there seems to be relatively strong increase in the use of debt. The 
coefficient doubles from 0,15 to 0,30 from the first to the third period. Also in Sweden it almost 
doubles from 0,10 to 0,19. Euro500 gives results in the same direction with the change from  
 
 
Table 7. Test for pecking order with aggregated model. Sample period is from 2007 to 2015, 
which is also divided into three sub-periods: 2007-2009, 2010-2012 and 2013-2015. Financials 
and utilizes are excluded. Table is also shared into different markets by separate currencies and 
interest rates. The estimated regression is: Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝑃𝑂 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + µ𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the change 
of net debt between year t and t-1. 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 stands for financial deficit, which is calculated by: 
dividends + investments + change in working capital – cash flow, µ is the unobservable firm 
fixed effect and ε is the error term. All variables are scaled by total assets. T-values are reported 
in the parentheses. 
Denmark 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant  0,04 0,00 0,05 0,03 
  (2,08) (0,38) (3,63) (4,18) 
Financial deficit 0,15 0,20 0,30 0,23 
  (1,09) (2,75) (4,14) (5,80) 
N 104 151 127 382 
𝑅2 0,44 0,50 0,38 0,25 
          
Euro500 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant  0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 
  (5,21) (7,37) (3,81) (9,24) 
Financial deficit 0,14 0,38 0,23 0,22 
  (3,33) (9,32) (5,22) (11,50) 
N 506 819 930 2255 
𝑅2 0,52 0,42 0,43 0,24 
          
Sweden 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant  0,01 0,01 0,02 0,00 
  (0,73) (1,69) (3,71) (0,90) 
Financial deficit 0,10 0,01 0,19 0,03 
  (2,04) (1,15) (5,58) (3,97) 
N 254 415 407 1076 
𝑅2 0,44 0,32 0,44 0,15 
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Switzerland 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant  0,03 0,04 0,02 0,03 
  (3,08) (3,79) (2,09) (7,56) 
Financial deficit 0,15 0,23 0,14 0,20 
  (3,21) (3,31) (2,94) (8,71) 
N 178 307 350 835 
𝑅2 0,53 0,35 0,43 0,21 
          
All countries 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant  0,02 0,00 0,02 0,01 
  (5,78) (1,46) (6,53) (6,48) 
Financial deficit 0,13 0,04 0,20 0,08 
  (4,86) (3,77) (9,07) (11,03) 
N 1042 1682 1814 4548 
𝑅2 0,50 0,36 0,43 0,19 
 
 
0,14 to 0,23, however, it peaks in 0,38 in the second period. This difference relative to 
other markets could be reasoned behind European Central Bank’s (ECB) actions 
towards European sovereign debt crisis, which in turn would have reflected to the 
companies within the area. However, this exact reason cannot be proved by the data. 
Switzerland faces same kind of increase in debt in 2010-2012, but when comparing the 
first and third period, the coefficient stays in 0,14-0,15 frame. It is also worth to notice 
that 𝑅2  has the lowest values in the second period within every market excluding 
Denmark. 
 
Table 8. models pecking order theory in disaggregated form. It is separated into 
different markets and time periods as the previous table. Dependent variable is also the 
same change in net debt, but the independent variable, financial deficit, is sliced into its 
components: dividends, cash used in investments, change in working capital and cash 
flow before taxes. On the contrary to the aggregated model, disaggregated model 
provides mostly statistically insignificant results. If inspecting the whole time period 
from 2007 to 2015, the best fit is with the Euro sample, which has dividends, 
investments and cash flow as statistically significant independent variables. 
Additionally, the coefficients are far from unity, thus causing rejection of second 
hypothesis, which expects all individual disaggregated independent variables to act as 
the aggregated model. Only coefficient of determinations seem to be in the same ball- 
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Table 8. Test for pecking order with disaggregated model. Sample period is from 2007 to 2015, 
which is also divided into three sub-periods: 2007-2009, 2010-2012 and 2013-2015. Financials 
and utilizes are excluded. Table is also shared into different markets by separate currencies and 
interest rates. The estimated regression is: Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑊𝐶Δ𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽𝐶𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + µ𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Δ𝐷  is the change of net debt between t and t-1, α is constant, 𝐷𝐼𝑉 is paid 
ordinary dividends, INV is investments, ΔWC is the change in working capital between t and t-
1 and CF is the cash flow before taxes, µ is the unobservable firm fixed effect and ε is the error 
term. All variables are scaled by total assets. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Denmark 
  
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2013-
2015 
Total 
C 0,03 -0,03 -0,01 -0,01 
  (1,33) -(2,15) -(0,64) -(0,85) 
Div. -0,11 0,80 0,01 0,19 
  -(0,20) (2,78) (0,07) (1,71) 
Inv. -0,10 0,10 0,32 -0,03 
  -(0,38) (0,56) (1,95) -(0,39) 
ΔWC -0,10 -0,09 -0,10 -0,06 
  -(0,56) -(1,15) -(1,27) -(1,62) 
CF -0,04 -0,09 0,12 -0,04 
  -(0,21) -(0,59) (0,89) -(0,93) 
          
N 115 169 151 435 
𝑅2  0,43 0,5 0,29 0,19 
 
Euro 500 
  
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2013-
2015 
Total 
C 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,00 
  (0,32) (3,17) (1,60) (0,02) 
Div. 1,60 0,13 0,05 0,52 
  (6,06) (0,52) (0,26) (5,42) 
Inv. -0,60 0,14 -0,10 -0,16 
  -(4,01) (1,39) -(1,23) -(3,30) 
ΔWC 0,05 0,17 0,18 0,03 
  (0,58) (2,36) (2,00) (0,95) 
CF -0,29 -0,49 -0,31 -0,14 
  -(1,66) -(3,83) -(2,19) -(2,56) 
N 531 848 975 2354 
𝑅2  0,58 0,35 0,41 0,2 
Sweden 
  
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2013-
2015 
Total 
C 0,00 0,03 -0,01 0,00 
  -(0,31) (2,57) -(1,32) -(0,35) 
Div. 0,10 0,00 -0,01 0,00 
  (0,46) (0,27) -(0,11) (0,46) 
Inv. 0,28 -0,07 0,38 0,11 
  (1,36) -(0,86) (3,97) (2,24) 
ΔWC 0,05 0,06 0,23 0,09 
  (0,52) (0,93) (3,47) (3,06) 
CF -0,09 -0,21 0,06 -0,01 
  -(0,52) -(2,09) (0,63) -(0,18) 
     
N 284 482 507 1273 
𝑅2  0,43 0,35 0,42 0,17 
 
Switzerland 
  
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2013-
2015 
Total 
C 0,01 0,05 -0,01 0,02 
  (0,50) (2,49) -(0,61) (3,85) 
Div. 0,35 0,21 0,09 -0,11 
  (0,52) (0,66) (0,40) -(1,03) 
Inv. -0,12 -0,06 -0,31 -0,07 
  -(0,63) -(0,37) -(2,24) -(0,98) 
ΔWC -0,02 0,22 -0,05 0,00 
  -(0,61) (1,98) -(0,84) -(0,20) 
CF -0,16 -0,45 0,03 -0,14 
  -(1,03) -(2,45) (0,27) -(3,52) 
N 184 311 356 851 
𝑅2  0,54 0,35 0,43 0,16 
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All countries 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant 0,01 0,02 -0,01 0,00 
  (1,02) (2,93) -(1,82) (0,86) 
Div. 0,47 0,00 0,02 0,01 
  (3,17) (0,37) (0,29) (0,81) 
Inv. -0,19 -0,02 0,09 -0,02 
  -(1,98) -(0,31) (1,63) -(0,58) 
ΔWC -0,02 0,03 0,09 0,01 
  -(0,91) (1,03) (2,61) (0,78) 
CF -0,15 -0,18 0,04 -0,03 
  -(2,01) -(3,22) (0,81) -(1,44) 
          
N 1114 1810 1989 4913 
𝑅2  0,49 0,36 0,38 0,17 
 
 
park with the aggregated model. In the end these results more weaken than makes the 
results robust for supporting pecking order theory. 
 
The results of disaggregated might be better and more significant, if continuous data 
and balanced panel were in use. However, available data in Orbis is not complete 
enough and even if there were companies that would fulfill the continuous data within 
every variable, the sample would probably be much smaller and the results would not 
necessarily reflect the characteristics of the whole desired population.  
 
Table 9. compares table 7. regression with different leverage factors as dependent 
variable. ΔND is the change in net debt, which is the same dependent variable as 
previous tables. ΔLTD is the change in long-term debt and ΔTD is the change in total 
debt. All the variables are scaled with total assets. Shyam-Sunders and Meyers (1999) 
and Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that net debt is the best dependent variable paired 
with measuring deficit, because current assets have been subtracted from the figure, thus 
it should reflect the “true” or net amount of liabilities the best. Therefore, it controls for 
liquidity and measures potential financial distress better than other variables. However, 
it is also interesting to measure the effects on long-term debt and total debt. Long-term 
debt should reflect for example investments better, because usually investments have 
longer time frames than operational work. On the other hand, total debt takes all debt 
into account without any subtractions, thus giving the clearest view on pure debt ratio.  
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This table has also regressions with interest rate as an additional control variable. It is 
intriguing to see, whether or not it has a significant effect on the leverage ratios. Interest 
rate may not have direct effect on the pecking order theory, but it does have an indirect 
effect through information asymmetry and financial distress, which are the main reasons 
why debt is preferred over external equity by the theory. 
 
 
Table 9. Test for pecking order with aggregated model including interest rate. Sample period is 
from 2007 to 2015 including all the public listed companies in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the top 500 corporations by market capitalization in European Monetary Union. Financials 
and utilizes are excluded. Table is also shared into six columns by different leverage measures 
as dependent variables. The estimated regression is: Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡  = α + 𝛽𝑃𝑂  𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡  + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡+ µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . 
Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the change of debt between year t and t-1. ΔND is the change of net debt, ΔLTD is the 
change of long-term debt and ΔTD is the change of total debt. 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 stands for financial deficit, 
which is calculated by: dividends + investments + change in working capital – cash flow. 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is 
the LIBOR equivalent interest rate within each market, µ is the unobservable firm fixed effect 
and ε is the error term. All variables are scaled by total assets. T-values are reported in the 
parentheses. 
  ΔND ΔLTD ΔTD 
Constant  0,009 0,005 0,003 0,001 0,004 -0,001 
  (6,48) (2,95) (2,52) (0,36) (1,71) -(0,75) 
Financial deficit 0,077 0,076 0,028 0,027 0,038 0,037 
  (11,03) (10,88) (4,36) (4,25) (5,81) (5,67) 
Interest rate   0,005   0,003   0,004 
    (4,14)   (2,96)   (3,75) 
              
N 4548 4548 4534 4534 4534 4534 
𝑅2  0,19 0,19 0,14 0,14 0,18 0,18 
 
 
Regressions with net debt as the dependent variable give the highest r-squared and t-
values, which are also highly statistically significant. These results support the use of 
net debt as the dependent variable. It is also logical that net debt has higher coefficient 
relative to two other leverage measures, because they have not been netted. However, 
the coefficients are far from unity and therefore do not support pecking order 
hypothesis. Also interest rates have an unexpected plus signs on their coefficients. 
Positive correlation with leverage show that firms have decreased their leverage, while 
the interest rates have gone down. Common sense might suggest otherwise, since it 
should be cheaper to lend and thus one would expect negative correlation with interest 
rate and leverage. However, the coefficients might be economically insignificant. On 
the other hand, if perceived from the information asymmetry and financial distress 
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perspective, the decreasing leverage with interest rate might suggest that equity 
financing would have become relatively more affordable and attractive. 
 
 
Table 10. Test for pecking order with disaggregated model including interest rate. Sample 
period is from 2007 to 2015 including all the public listed companies in Denmark, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the top 500 corporations by market capitalization in European Monetary Union. 
Financials and utilizes are excluded. Table is also shared into six columns by different leverage 
measures as dependent variables. The estimated regression is: Δ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡  = α + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑊𝐶Δ𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡+ µ𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the change of debt between year t 
and t-1. ΔND is the change of net debt, ΔLTD is the change of long-term debt and ΔTD is the 
change of total debt. α is constant, 𝐷𝐼𝑉 is paid ordinary dividends, INV is investments, ΔWC is 
the change in working capital between t and t-1 and CF is the cash flow before taxes. 𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is the 
LIBOR equivalent interest rate within each market, µ is the unobservable firm fixed effect and ε 
is the error term. All variables, excluding interest rate, are scaled by total assets. T-values are 
reported in the parentheses. 
  ΔND ΔLTD ΔTD 
Constant 0,002 -0,002 0,005 0,003 0,026 0,023 
  (0,86) -(0,94) (2,50) (1,36) (11,91) (9,94) 
Div. 0,007 0,007 0,008 0,008 0,037 0,037 
  (0,81) (0,82) (1,09) (1,09) (4,46) (4,47) 
Inv. -0,016 -0,017 0,104 0,104 0,032 0,031 
  -(0,58) -(0,61) (4,19) (4,18) (1,22) (1,20) 
ΔWC 0,009 0,010 0,000 0,002 0,011 0,014 
  (0,78) (0,89) (0,01) (0,16) (0,98) (1,19) 
CF -0,029 -0,034 -0,062 -0,067 -0,321 -0,328 
  -(1,44) -(1,68) -(3,09) -(3,34) -(15,21) -(15,56) 
Int.   0,006   0,003   0,005 
    (4,89)   (3,35)   (4,68) 
N 4913 4913 4890 4890 4890 4890 
𝑅2  0,17 0,17 0,14 0,14 0,21 0,21 
 
 
The table 10. shows the previous table in disaggregated form. Dependent variables are 
the same as in table 9. and the sample includes the same countries and time period. 
Independent variables are the same as in table 8. with an additional regression including 
interest rate. On the contrary to the aggregated models in table 9, the most significant 
results are gained using total debt instead of net debt. Net debt has only interest rate as 
statistically significant variable, which is also significant with all three dependent 
variables. Cash flow has negative and statistically significant coefficient for both long-
term debt and total debt, which support pecking order theory, because internal funds 
should reduce the use of debt. Additional significant variables are investments for long-
term debt and dividends for total debt. Change in working capital is insignificant for 
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them both. Investment’s significance for long-term debt could be explained because of 
its own nature of tending to be long-term projects with matching long-term finance.  
 
However, all the variables are far from being unity, so they are not mirroring change in 
deficit with the same change in debt. Interest rate has same kind of implications in 
aggregated and disaggregated models, thus it can be regarded robust in that sense. 
However, the economic effect on the change in debt is doubtful.  
 
 
5.2. Static trade-off theory tests 
 
This section of the chapter is used to test the static trade-off theory, using conventional 
leverage testing model. As pecking order theory is the main competitor of trade-off 
theory, deficit is added to the model. If pecking order was a key driver, the effect of 
deficit should dominate and wipe the other independent variables’ effects. On top of 
interest rates being one major point of interest in this thesis, it can also have a major 
effect on leverage by trade-off theory. Tax-shield is a fundamental argument and key 
driver in the theory. Debt is raised to create that shield out of paid interests. Thus, 
interest rate should be a major factor contributing to the required amount of debt.  
 
Table 11. shows the regression of tangible assets, market-to-book ratio, natural 
logarithm of sales, profitability, financial deficit and interest rate on leverage. All the 
accounting variables are taken with first differences and they are also scaled with total 
assets. Fixed effects with unbalanced panels are used as in the previous tables. These 
factors have been highly significant in many major papers, including Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003). Tangible assets 
measure the amount of fixed tangible assets to total assets. Empirical evidence thus far 
has supported positive relationship between leverage and this factor. One reason could 
be that financing tangible asset with debt it relatively easy, because the asset itself can 
be used as collateral in many cases.  
 
Market-to-book (MBT) ratio is often used as a proxy for growth and value companies. 
High MBT means that investors value the potential of company to greater what it’s 
book value of assets would prove otherwise. This implies higher expected growth in the 
future. On the other hand, lower value predicts that investors do not see high growth 
potential in the firm. Using debt may not be always the best or easiest way to acquire 
financing for a growth company. Lenders usually want secure collateral for debt, and  
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Table 11. Test for trade-off model using conventional leverage testing regression. Sample 
period is from 2007 to 2015, which is also divided into three sub-periods: 2007-2009, 2010-
2012 and 2013-2015. It includes all the public listed companies in Denmark, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the top 500 corporations by market capitalization in European Monetary Union. 
Financials and utilizes are excluded. Regression used is: Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝑇 Δ𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀𝑇𝐵 𝛥𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡+ 
𝛽𝐿𝑆 𝛥𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽𝑃 𝛥𝑃𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐹  𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽𝐼  𝐼𝑖,𝑡  + µ𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . ∆D is the change in net debt, α is the 
constant variable, ∆T is the change in tangible assets, ∆LS is the change in logarithm of sales, 
∆P is the change in profitability, DEF measures the financial deficit (dividends + investments + 
change in working capital – cash flow) and I stands for the local LIBOR equivalent interest rate, 
µ is the unobservable firm fixed effect and ε is the error term. All variables, excluding interest 
rate, are scaled by total assets. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Denmark 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant 0,018 0,018 0,041 0,029 
  (0,56) (1,43) (2,91) (4,26) 
ΔT -0,093 -0,253 -0,496 -0,041 
  -(0,40) -(2,12) -(2,84) -(0,66) 
ΔMTB -0,083 -0,015 -0,018 -0,008 
  -(2,45) -(1,58) -(1,26) -(1,10) 
ΔLS -0,016 0,009 0,026 0,069 
  -(0,19) (0,28) (0,66) (3,50) 
ΔP -0,334 -0,479 -0,311 -0,319 
  -(1,88) -(4,57) -(3,32) -(6,63) 
DEF 0,230 0,284 0,160 0,153 
  (1,62) (5,87) (2,22) (4,47) 
I -0,008 0,023 -0,040 -0,006 
  -(1,04) (1,94) -(1,24) -(2,33) 
N 96 143 120 359 
𝑅2  0,57 0,68 0,61 0,35 
Euro 500 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant -0,022 0,014 -0,015 0,002 
  -(3,44) (2,81) -(3,08) (1,09) 
ΔT -0,525 -0,063 0,105 -0,127 
  -(4,48) -(0,86) (1,65) -(3,46) 
ΔMTB -0,039 -0,031 -0,009 -0,032 
  -(4,16) -(3,54) -(1,13) -(7,82) 
ΔLS -0,084 -0,012 0,014 0,002 
  -(3,62) -(1,19) (1,28) (0,27) 
ΔP -0,255 -0,188 -0,262 -0,218 
  -(5,68) -(4,61) -(4,71) -(9,81) 
DEF 0,132 0,161 -0,110 0,064 
  (3,66) (4,42) -(2,85) (4,10) 
I 0,013 0,000 0,002 0,001 
  (3,78) (0,09) (0,15) (0,88) 
N 475 746 867 2088 
𝑅2  0,67 0,39 0,41 0,26 
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Sweden 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant -0,060 -0,007 0,029 0,000 
  -(3,85) -(0,46) (4,07) -(0,02) 
ΔT 0,208 0,053 0,237 0,148 
  (1,00) (0,36) (1,77) (2,09) 
ΔMTB -0,003 -0,010 -0,014 -0,016 
  -(0,36) -(1,52) -(2,51) -(5,20) 
ΔLS 0,013 0,092 0,080 0,090 
  (0,34) (3,94) (4,70) (8,53) 
ΔP -0,102 -0,195 -0,221 -0,186 
  -(1,78) -(6,40) -(5,40) -(9,63) 
DEF 0,093 -0,003 0,108 0,005 
  (1,49) -(0,32) (2,88) (0,64) 
I 0,031 0,002 -0,018 -0,002 
  (4,21) (0,28) -(2,96) -(0,96) 
          
N 230 385 361 976 
𝑅2  0,71 0,45 0,61 0,37 
     
     
          
Switzerland 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant 0,022 0,029 0,021 0,012 
  (0,67) (3,11) (1,86) (2,48) 
ΔT -0,536 -0,074 -0,290 -0,262 
  -(1,77) -(0,55) -(1,67) -(3,19) 
ΔMTB -0,031 -0,011 -0,026 -0,023 
  -(1,34) -(0,90) -(2,09) -(3,82) 
ΔLS -0,028 0,007 -0,086 -0,014 
  -(0,34) (0,34) -(2,07) -(0,91) 
ΔP -0,167 -0,094 0,115 -0,060 
  -(1,10) -(1,85) (2,14) -(1,83) 
DEF 0,084 0,217 0,179 0,106 
  (0,66) (3,72) (2,37) (3,51) 
I -0,040 -0,082 -0,019 -0,011 
  -(0,60) -(1,46) -(1,91) -(1,58) 
          
N 157 279 327 763 
𝑅2  0,44 0,52 0,36 0,18 
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All countries 
  2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 Total 
Constant -0,021 -0,003 0,007 0,000 
  -(3,33) -(0,81) (2,08) (0,10) 
ΔT -0,335 -0,006 -0,030 -0,053 
  -(3,78) -(0,10) -(0,59) -(1,94) 
ΔMTB -0,022 -0,016 -0,015 -0,019 
  -(4,15) -(4,08) -(3,61) -(9,06) 
ΔLS -0,052 0,027 0,042 0,036 
  -(2,72) (3,24) (4,68) (7,28) 
ΔP -0,217 -0,210 -0,127 -0,191 
  -(5,84) -(10,75) -(5,16) -(15,53) 
DEF 0,112 0,014 0,037 0,021 
  (3,52) (1,81) (1,57) (3,46) 
I 0,013 0,003 -0,012 0,000 
  (4,37) (0,86) -(2,71) -(0,33) 
          
N 958 1553 1675 4186 
𝑅2  0,58 0,43 0,42 0,26 
 
 
book value is closer to the liquidating value. Growth ventures tend to be riskier, and 
thus external equity can be more logical and plausible financing choice. Sales is the size 
factor. Literature predicts that it is easier for big companies to acquire debt relative to 
small companies. Mature, proved and established business can be regarded as a factor 
that is often connected with the size, and this is often interpreted as a feature, which 
reduces the financial distress costs and allow higher leverage potential. Trade-off theory 
expects that profitable firms should increase their leverage, because good profitability 
reduces financial distress costs, thus rises the maximum leverage potential. High profit 
should also mean the need for larger tax-shield, which also validates increasing 
leverage. However, the empirical literature does not support this, but the opposite. 
Profitable firms seem to have less debt, which coincides pecking order theory. 
 
Regression results for combined markets and total period show mainly highly 
statistically significant results. Constant and interest rates are not significant in the total 
period and tangibility is very close to be significant at 5% level. However, the results 
implicate negative relationship between tangibility and debt, which is in the contrary to 
the previous research and what the theory and even common sense could suggest. 
Strongest negative relationship is in 2007-2009 (-0,335) and the crisis period may be 
one reason behind the relationship. In rest of the period the relationship is weak and 
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insignificant. Aftermath of the crisis could be one reason causing mixed results and thus 
insignificant coefficients.  
 
Market-to-book ratio seems has highly significant results for the total and sub periods. 
The sign is negative as predicted. Thus, growth companies tend to have less leverage by 
the table. Positive relationship between size and leverage is also well supported in the 
results. Only in period 2007-2009 it has negative relationship. One possible explanation 
behind this could be that large companies were more able to deleverage in the crisis, If 
we assume that large companies have smaller financial distress costs and they are less 
financially constrained on average. After the crisis, these large companies would have 
been able to increase leverage again.  
 
Profitability has negative relationship with debt, as found out in the previous empirical 
papers. The factor has relatively high coefficients and they are highly statistically 
significant. As already mentioned, this is against trade-off theory, and supports more 
pecking order theory. Financial deficit is significant factor in total period and in 2007-
2009. However, it does not seem to dominate the results and therefore explicit support 
and evidence in the favor of pecking order theory cannot be claimed. Interest rate does 
not have significant result when inspecting the whole time period. Interestingly, it has 
statistically significant coefficient in 2009-2009, while it has statistically significant 
negative coefficient in 2013-2015. On average, there was clear declining trend of 
interest rates in the both periods, as can be checked in table 6. Positive relationship in 
2009-2009 might not be surprise after pecking order regressions, but in this 
conventional leverage regression, the period of negative interest rates shows finally 
negative relationship between the rates and debt. Thus, this column indicates that 
declining interest rates under zero-bound has caused an increase on corporate debt.  
 
Denmark has statistically significant independent variables when measured the whole 
period, excluding tangibility and MTB. However, tangibility has significant negative 
coefficients from 2010 to 2015. This result is surprising as tangibility should support 
leverage. MTB has only significant and result in 2007-2009, which goes along with the 
established theory with the negative coefficient. Even though sales or the size factor 
does not have statistically significant results when inspecting the sub periods separately, 
it does have a significant positive correlation when using the whole period, which 
supports trade-off theory and previous papers. Profitability is highly statistically 
significant, excluding in 2007-2009, with negative sign and it also supports previous 
empirical research. Deficit has relatively large and significant coefficients. Combining 
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with the results in profitability might suggest stronger support for pecking order in 
Denmark. It also has negative relationship between interest rate and debt ratio. Only in 
2010-2012 there is positive, but insignificant coefficient. This outcome supports central 
bank’s policy of decreasing interest rate in order to increase corporate lending.  
 
For the EMU companies within the full sample period, size and interest rate do not have 
statistically significant results. Tangibility is significant with the full sample and in 
2007-2009, but insignificant in 2010-2012 and 2013-2015 periods. However, all the 
coefficients follow the same negative notion as Denmark and the whole market sample.  
Market-to-book ratio is highly significant in the total time period and only insignificant 
period can be found between 2013-2015. It also follows the same trend of negative 
relationship with leverage, indicating less debt for growth companies. Size factor is not 
significant with the total time period with only 2007-2009 being significant, and the 
direction of coefficients are also mixed. Profitability is highly significant in every 
measured period and the relationship stands negative as the results have been thus far. 
Deficit is also statistically significant and has a fair impact on the leverage. Interestingly 
the relationship turns negative in 2013-2015, which at least counters the pecking order 
theory possibility in that period. Interest rate is significant only in 2007-2009 for Euro 
500 sample.  
 
Conventional leverage testing variables are all significant in Swedish sample. 
Tangibility is significant with total time period, but the variables of three sub periods 
are not. However, tangibility has positive relationship with debt in Sweden, which in 
contrary to all other countries in the sample. Positive relationship is also what many 
other papers have found thus far and this result supports trade-off theory in Sweden. 
Market-to-book ratio has negative relationship with leverage also with Swedish 
companies. Size factor is highly significant and positive, supporting trade-off theory too. 
Profitability has statistically significant negative coefficient, continuing the fashion.  
Deficit has mainly insignificant parameters, excluding 2013-2015. Interest rate behaves 
with Swedish sample like it does with whole sample. It is highly significant and positive 
in 2007-2009, while it turns to negative in 2013-2015.  
 
Tangibility is highly significant in Switzerland using the total time period as the sample. 
However, it is not significant in the individual sub samples. It has also negative 
relationship with debt, as found in the other countries, excluding Sweden. Growth 
companies continue facing negative relationship with debt, while size is mainly 
insignificant factor. Unlike in other countries, profitability factor is not highly 
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significant in Switzerland. 2013-2015 period is the only one with significant 
profitability parameter and it is positive as opposed to rest of the findings. This small 
finding supports a bit trade-off theory. On the other hand, deficit factors are more 
significant and speak for pecking order theory. Interest rate is not statistically significant, 
but it has negative coefficients in every period, which gives small hint towards reducing 
interest rate increasing leverage, but this cannot be statistically proven by the results.  
 
 
5.3. Comparing trade-off theory to pecking order theory 
 
Table 12. shows the summed up results of conventional leverage testing regarding 
pecking order and trade-off theories. Results are divided by a market with total time 
period. A point “+” is given to the respective theory, if the factor supports it by 
hypothesis 3 (table 2.). When including all countries in the sample, pecking order wins 
by 4 against 2. It is also dominant in Denmark by 5-2 and Euro 500 with 3-1. Only in 
Sweden trade-off theory wins by 2-4, where as in Switzerland the points are even with 
2-2. However, this table does not sum the effects of interest rate that well, but it is worth 
no note that there was significant negative relationship between debt and interest rate in 
2013-2015 (negative interest rate period) in the sample including all countries and in 
Danish, Swedish and Swiss individual samples. Thus one can conclude that, at least in 
this period, there is evidence and support for the argument of reducing interest rate does 
increase the leverage of a company on average.  
 
 
Table 12. Results of leverage testing regarding the hypothesis 3. Evidence supporting pecking 
order theory or trade-off theory is marked with “+”, and the total amount of points is showed at 
the bottom. The coefficients of the total time period are used.  
  Denmark Euro 500 Sweden 
  Pecking order Trade-off Pecking order Trade-off Pecking order Trade-off 
Tangibility +   +     + 
MTB       +   + 
Sales + +     + + 
Profit +   +   +   
Deficit +   +     + 
Interest + +         
Points 5 2 3 1 2 4 
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  Switzerland All countries      
  Pecking order Trade-off Pecking order Trade-off     
Tangibility +   +       
MTB   +   +     
Sales     + +     
Profit   + +       
Deficit +   +       
Interest             
Total 2 2 4 2     
 
 
5.4. Dynamic trade-off theory test 
 
Next is tested dynamic partial adjustment model by Flannery and Rangan (2006). This 
test acts as a robustness check as the conventional part in the model should give same 
kind of results as in the dynamic model. Additionally, this measures the adjustment 
speed of debt, which comes from the assumption that firms do not have exactly constant 
level of debt all the time. Their model tries to capture the speed of adjustment to the 
target level of debt. If the adjustment speed is great, it implies that the level is closer to 
being static, and vice versa.  
 
Upper part of the table shows the results of regressions without interest rate as variable. 
The adjustment speed of leverage is 0,57 (1-0,43) for whole sample. This indicates that 
it takes under two years on average to adjust to the target leverage ratio. Switzerland has 
the highest speed by 0,78, next Denmark with 0,66 and Euro500 and Sweden have 
roughly same adjustment coefficients with 0,43 and 0,44. All these figures are highly 
statistically significant. Tangibility has positive relationship with leverage in the whole 
sample and in every distinct market. It is also statistically significant in every market, 
excluding Euro500. Positive relationship with tangibility is expected by trade-off theory, 
which this result support. Market-to-book ratio has mixed results. It has positive and 
statistically significant coefficients in Denmark and Euro500, but in Sweden and 
Switzerland it has negative and insignificant results. Total sample’s result is also 
insignificant. The positive relationship with Denmark and Euro500 is against trade-off 
theory, because it implies that growth companies have relatively more debt. Size has 
mostly insignificant results with negative relationship with debt. This is against trade-
off theory, but statistical prove cannot be concluded from these results. Profitability has 
also negative relationship in every market, which is in line with other findings thus far, 
and it continues to be counter to trade-off theory. However, these results are not 
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statistically significant, which is surprising, considering it was highly statistically 
significant in conventional model. Overall, r-squared has high value in every column 
within each sample and the table suggests that the leverage adjustment variable is the 
driving factor.  
 
The bottom table shows the same regression with interest rate attached to it. Adjustment 
speeds and control variables stay almost intact. Compared to the upper part, only 
profitability turns out to be statistically significant in Euro500 and total sample. Interest 
rate is statistically significant in the total sample and with Euro500 sample, however, 
the coefficients are rather small and may not be economically significant. Table 
suggests that the adjustment speed has been strongest in Switzerland, where the 
sensitivity to interest rate has been weakest, whereas in Euro500 sample has the slowest 
adjustment speed with highly significant interest rate factor.  
 
 
Table 13. Test for dynamic partial adjusted trade-off model. Sample period is from 2007 to 
2015. It includes all the public listed companies in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the top 
500 corporations by market capitalization in European Monetary Union. Financials and utilizes 
are excluded. Regression used are: 𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1  = (𝜆𝛽)𝑋𝑖,𝑡  + (1-λ)𝐷𝑖,𝑡  + µ𝑖+1+𝜀𝑖+1  (upper table), 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 = (𝜆𝛽)𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + (1-λ)𝐷𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛾𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + µ𝑖+1+ 𝜀𝑖+1 (bottom table). D is the leverage ratio, X is a 
vector of firm characteristics (tangibility, market-to-book, logarithm of sales and profitability), I 
stands for the local LIBOR equivalent interest rate, µ is the fixed effect and ε is the error term. 
All variables, excluding interest rate, are scaled by total assets. T-values are reported in the 
parentheses. 
  Denmark Euro500 Sweden Switzerland Total 
Constant 0,16 0,22 0,19 0,28 0,24 
  (6,11) 18,203 (14,70) (13,55) (30,30) 
Leverage(-1) 0,34 0,57 0,56 0,22 0,43 
  (7,87) (31,97) (20,87) (6,17) (31,41) 
Tangibility 0,42 0,02 0,09 0,18 0,15 
  (6,37) (0,84) (2,02) (2,90) (7,01) 
Market-to-book 0,017 0,014 -0,001 -0,001 0,002 
  (3,32) (4,10) -(0,47) -(0,23) (1,55) 
Log Sales -0,08 -307,09 -4,30 -117,14 -0,79 
  -(0,02) -(0,52) -(0,74) -(2,45) -(0,28) 
Profitability -0,04 -0,01 -0,01 -0,03 -0,02 
  -(1,51) -(0,80) -(0,98) -(1,38) -(1,79) 
            
N 643 2702 1735 1076 6156 
𝑅2  0,73 0,92 0,85 0,80 0,85 
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  Denmark Euro500 Sweden Switzerland Total 
Constant 0,15 0,23 0,19 0,28 0,24 
  (5,84) (19,18) (14,10) (13,51) (29,95) 
Leverage(-1) 0,34 0,55 0,56 0,22 0,43 
  (7,89) (30,79) (20,81) (6,13) (31,15) 
Tangibility 0,42 0,01 0,09 0,19 0,15 
  (6,36) (0,48) (2,02) (2,90) (6,98) 
Market-to-book 0,017 0,012 -0,001 -0,001 0,002 
  (3,22) (3,69) -(0,49) -(0,25) (1,35) 
Log Sales 0,32 -1110,96 -4,50 -116,89 -0,51 
  (0,07) -(1,85) -(0,77) -(2,44) -(0,18) 
Profitability -0,04 -0,04 -0,02 -0,04 -0,02 
  -(1,55) -(2,15) -(1,08) -(1,39) -(2,22) 
Interest 0,003 0,004 0,002 0,001 0,004 
  (1,01) (6,85) (1,32) (0,26) (4,53) 
            
N 643 2702 1735 1076 6156 
𝑅2  0,73 0,92 0,85 0,80 0,85 
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6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
This chapter introduces the same models as previously inspected, but with dummy 
variables for period of zero or negative interest rates. Table 15 investigates aggregated 
pecking order model with dummy for negative interest rate 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔, gaining value one if 
interest rate is zero or negative and zero otherwise. Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔which indicates the deficit 
during negative interest rates. Countries are measured separately and together with firm 
and time fixed effects.  
 
 
Table 14. Test for pecking order theory. Sample period is from 2007 to 2015. Financials and 
utilizes are excluded. . It includes all the public listed companies in Denmark (DK), Sweden 
(SE), Switzerland (CH) and the top 500 corporations by market capitalization in European 
Monetary Union (Euro500). The estimated regression is: Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡  = α + 𝛽𝑃𝑂  𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  + 
𝛿2(Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔) + µ𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the change of net debt between year t and t-1. 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 stands for 
financial deficit, which is calculated by: dividends + investments + change in working capital – 
cash flow, 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔is a dummy variable for negative interest rate period, Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 denotes 
deficit during negative interest rate period, µ is the unobservable firm and time fixed effect 
and ε is the error term. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  DK Euro500 SE CH Total 
Constant 0,03 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,01 
  (2,42) (4,92) (0,73) (5,35) (1,81) 
Def 0,25 0,21 0,03 0,21 0,07 
  (6,01) (6,00) (1,78) (5,15) (2,22) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  0,02 0,00 0,02 -0,01 0,01 
  (1,78) -(0,91) (4,80) -(1,15) (1,41) 
Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 -0,04 0,01 0,10 -0,07 0,04 
  -(0,72) (0,37) (6,26) -(1,65) (1,29) 
            
N 382 2255 1076 835 4548 
𝑅2  0,26 0,24 0,15 0,22 0,2 
 
 
Table 15 implies that pecking order was stronger before negative interest rates than 
during it, because the coefficient of Def is higher than Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 , also Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  is 
mostly statistically insignificant, except in Sweden.  Overall, the coefficients are too far 
from unity, so pecking order hypothesis cannot be accepted and this table strengthens 
the findings of table 7. These results also strongly support that leverage increased in 
Sweden during negative interest rates.  
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Next, Table 16 is a modified table 9 with added dummy variables for period of negative 
interest rates and different countries with Euro500 being the base category. Changes in 
net debt (ND), long-term debt (LTD) and total debt (TD) are measured. Firm fixed 
effects are left out and time fixed effects are kept.  
 
Table 15. Test for pecking order with aggregated model including dummies for negative 
interest rate and countries. Euro500 is the base category. Sample period is from 2007 to 2015 
including all the public listed companies in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the top 500 
corporations by market capitalization in European Monetary Union. Financials and utilizes are 
excluded. Table is also shared into six columns by different leverage measures as dependent 
variables. The estimated regression is: Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝑃𝑂 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 + 𝛿2(Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔) + 𝛿3DK 
+ 𝛿4 SE + 𝛿5 CH + [𝛿6 (DK*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔) + 𝛿7(SE*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 ) + 𝛿8(CH*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔)] + µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is the 
change of debt between year t and t-1. ΔND is the change of net debt, ΔLTD is the change of 
long-term debt and ΔTD is the change of total debt. 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 stands for financial deficit, which is 
calculated by: dividends + investments + change in working capital – cash flow. , 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔is a 
dummy variable for negative interest rate period, Def* 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  denotes deficit during 
negative interest rate period, DK is dummy variable for Denmark, SE for Sweden and CH for 
Switzerland. µ is the time fixed effect and ε is the error term. T-values are reported in the 
parentheses. 
  ΔND ΔLTD ΔTD 
Constant 0,006 0,007 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 
  (1,48) (1,87) (1,58) (1,56) (0,66) (0,85) 
Def 0,059 0,058 0,023 0,022 0,042 0,042 
  (2,18) (2,18) (2,61) (2,64) (1,51) (1,51) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  0,007 -0,003 0,001 -0,002 -0,009 -0,015 
  (1,24) -(0,63) (0,24) -(0,73) -(1,03) -(1,62) 
Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 0,028 0,040 0,007 0,014 -0,031 -0,026 
  (0,97) (1,32) (0,62) (1,21) -(0,53) -(0,42) 
DK -0,001 -0,005 0,000 -0,002 0,004 0,002 
  -(0,19) -(0,71) (0,01) -(0,34) (0,74) (0,40) 
SE 0,000 -0,002 -0,002 -0,003 0,002 0,001 
  (0,05) -(0,37) -(0,58) -(0,84) (0,66) (0,34) 
CH 0,004 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 
  (0,84) (0,34) (0,04) -(0,09) (0,22) -(0,11) 
DK*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔   0,030   0,019   0,013 
    (4,31)   (3,07)   (1,90) 
SE*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔   0,014   0,009   0,006 
    (3,07)   (2,34)   (1,25) 
CH*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔   0,013   0,004   0,008 
    (2,68)   (0,82)   (1,86) 
              
N 4548 4548 4534 4534 4534 4534 
𝑅2  0,04 0,04 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 
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Table 16 shows that deficit is statistically significant with positive interest rates but not 
during negative rates. However, the figures are again far from unity, thereby rejecting 
the first hypothesis. Interestingly, DK/SE/CH* 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  are all positive and statistically 
significant for the change in net debt. Same applies for ΔLTD in Denmark and Sweden. ΔTD 
does not receive statistically significant results at 5% level, but Denmark and Switzerland have 
at 10% level. These results imply that net debt has increased in the respecting countries during 
the period of negative interest rates.  
 
Table 17 shows conventional leverage testing model with dummies for negative interest 
rate period. This table includes all the markets separately and together. This provides a 
change to inspect the effect of tangibility, market-to-book, sales, profitability and deficit 
before and after the negative rates. Table shows that during negative rates the change in 
leverage increased in every sample, excluding Switzerland with the second model. It 
seems that tangibility was mostly negatively correlated with change in net debt before 
negative rates, but for Denmark and Switzerland, it turned to positive after the change. 
MTB correlates negatively before negative rates but turns positive in Sweden and total 
sample after the introduction of negative rates (NR). Sales is mainly positively 
correlated across the samples but turns negative in Sweden after NR. Profitability is 
negatively correlated before negative interest rates, but it changes to positive after. 
Finally, financial deficit seems to correlate positively with debt before NR, however 
after its economic and statistical significances drop with Switzerland’s coefficient 
falling to negative during NR. Overall, this table’s results seem to go well align with  
Table 11’s results.  
 
Table 18 examines dynamic partial adjusted trade-off model with dummy variables for 
the negative interest rate period. First interesting notion is that before negative interest 
rates, the adjustment speed for debt (1- coefficient for D(-1)) is faster in Euro500 and 
Sweden, but slower in Denmark and Switzerland that what Table 13 implies. Total 
sample’s speed is also a bit faster. However, these coefficients change quite 
dramatically in negative interest rate period. Only Switzerland has statistically 
significant result, but this might be due to having longest and steepest declining market 
rates compared to the other markets. Nevertheless, it seems that this coefficient has 
changed to negative across the sample excluding Denmark and they are close to zero, 
indicating almost instant adjustment speed to target leverage. Negative figure depicts 
that there is mean reversion, so that an increase in leverage during the previous year has 
led to a small decrease in leverage in the present year. 
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Table 16. Test for trade-off model using conventional leverage testing regression with dummies for 
negative interest rate period. Sample period is from 2007 to 2015. It includes all the public listed 
companies in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the top 500 corporations by market capitalization in 
European Monetary Union. Financials and utilizes are excluded. Regression used is: Δ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝑇 Δ𝑇𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽𝑀𝑇𝐵 𝛥𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽𝐿𝑆 𝛥𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽𝑃 𝛥𝑃𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐹 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + + 𝛿1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 + [𝛿2(Δ𝑇𝑖,𝑡*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔) + 𝛿3(𝛥𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔) + 
𝛿4 (𝛥𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔) + 𝛿5(𝛥𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔) + 𝛿6(Def * 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔)] + µ𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. ∆D is the change in net debt, α is the 
constant variable, ∆T is the change in tangible assets, ∆LS is the change in logarithm of sales, ∆P is the 
change in profitability, DEF measures the financial deficit (dividends + investments + change in working 
capital – cash flow) and 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔is a dummy variable for negative interest rate period, µ is the unobservable 
fixed effect and ε is the error term. All samples have firm fixed effects and the total sample has 
additionally time fixed effect. All variables are scaled by total assets. T-values are reported in the 
parentheses. 
  Denmark Euro500 Sweden Switzerland Total 
Constant 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,01 0,01 
  (3,96) (3,78) (5,85) (5,91) -(0,60) -(0,70) (5,60) (5,52) (1,44) (1,37) 
ΔT -0,13 -0,14 -0,22 -0,19 -0,04 -0,03 -0,13 -0,17 -0,09 -0,08 
  -(1,73) -(1,70) -(3,66) -(2,92) -(0,61) -(0,37) -(3,49) -(7,29) -(3,00) -(2,26) 
ΔMTB -0,02 -0,02 -0,03 -0,03 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 
  -(4,05) -(3,60) -(3,44) -(3,28) -(4,59) -(5,09) -(3,53) -(3,35) -(6,60) -(7,08) 
ΔLS 0,03 -0,02 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,07 0,00 -0,01 0,01 0,04 
  (4,77) -(0,65) -(0,79) (0,84) (1,41) (3,47) (0,21) -(0,51) (2,53) (3,97) 
ΔP -0,02 -0,16 0,01 -0,11 0,07 -0,06 0,00 0,02 0,04 -0,08 
  -(0,63) -(3,87) (1,11) -(5,71) (3,75) -(5,14) (0,13) (0,94) (4,20) -(4,15) 
Def -0,13 0,28 -0,10 0,20 -0,06 0,02 0,04 0,23 -0,07 0,06 
  -(2,74) (7,09) -(4,95) (5,43) -(4,82) (1,64) (1,71) (8,06) -(3,36) (2,03) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  0,29 0,03 0,20 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,20 -0,01 0,06 0,01 
  (7,65) (2,70) (5,40) (1,49) (1,63) (2,11) (8,21) -(3,54) (2,05) (4,07) 
ΔT*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔   0,26   -0,30   -0,40   0,23   -0,14 
    (2,68)   -(2,23)   -(2,15)   (2,69)   -(2,62) 
ΔMTB*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔   0,00   0,00   0,02   0,00   0,02 
    (0,31)   (0,21)   (6,79)   -(0,37)   (4,11) 
ΔLS*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔   0,06   0,01   -0,07   0,09   0,01 
    (1,52)   (0,72)   -(2,30)   (1,79)   (0,39) 
ΔP*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔   0,28   0,13   -0,01   0,07   0,07 
    (4,26)   (2,17)   -(0,36)   (2,58)   (3,55) 
Def*𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔   -0,02   0,05   0,09   -0,11   0,04 
    -(0,38)   (3,78)   (2,80)   -(4,44)   (2,46) 
                      
N 361 361 2088 2088 987 987 763 763 4199 4199 
𝑅2  0,38 0,39 0,27 0,27 0,19 0,20 0,23 0,24 0,22 0,23 
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Table 17. Test for dynamic partial adjusted trade-off model with dummies for negative interest 
rate period. Sample period is from 2007 to 2015. It includes all the public listed companies in 
Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the top 500 corporations by market capitalization in 
European Monetary Union. Financials and utilizes are excluded. Regression used is: 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 
(𝜆𝛽)𝑋𝑖,𝑡-1 + (1-λ)𝐷𝑖,𝑡-1+(𝜆𝛿1)𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  + (𝜆𝛿𝑖)(𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 *𝑋𝑖,𝑡-1 ) +(1-λ)(𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝐷𝑖,𝑡-1)+ μ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖. D is the 
leverage ratio, X is a vector of firm characteristics (tangibility, market-to-book, logarithm of 
sales and profitability), and 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔is a dummy variable for negative interest rate period, μ is the 
firm (and time for total sample) fixed effect and ε is the error term. All variables are scaled by 
total assets. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  Denmark Euro500 Sweden Switzerland Total 
Constant -0,04 0,07 0,01 -0,09 0,01 
  -(0,67) (3,36) (1,06) -(3,40) (0,34) 
D(-1) 0,41 0,50 0,35 0,37 0,39 
  (2,96) (8,85) (3,43) (3,60) (0,00) 
T(-1) 0,14 0,00 0,14 0,40 0,16 
  (0,69) (0,01) (2,79) (3,48) (0,00) 
MTB(-1) 0,03 0,02 -0,01 0,00 0,00 
  (2,28) (2,43) -(0,93) (0,06) (0,84) 
LS(-1) 12,84 -1225,27 -14,31 -244,96 5,48 
  (1,20) -(1,15) -(1,81) -(2,07) (0,36) 
P(-1) -0,02 0,04 0,03 -0,01 0,01 
  -(1,13) (0,80) (1,12) -(0,27) (0,72) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔  -0,03 0,03 0,08 0,05 0,05 
  -(1,27) (0,93) (3,25) (1,01) (0,00) 
D(-1)* 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 0,09 -0,03 -0,06 -0,13 -0,04 
  (1,11) -(1,29) -(1,11) -(2,57) (0,24) 
T(-1)* 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 -0,11 -0,01 0,10 0,00 -0,01 
  -(2,76) -(2,02) (3,01) -(0,13) (0,78) 
MBT(-1)* 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 0,00 0,00 -0,02 0,00 0,00 
  -(0,42) -(1,13) -(3,06) (0,10) (0,27) 
LS(-1)* 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
  (1,04) -(0,80) -(2,06) -(1,24) (0,12) 
P(-1)* 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔 0,04 -0,02 -0,13 -0,02 -0,02 
  (0,37) -(0,28) -(3,17) -(0,15) (0,78) 
            
N 653 2694 1728 1075 6150 
𝑅2  0,84 0,91 0,86 0,86 0,88 
 
 
Across Table 18 the values before negative interest rates bring same kind of results as 
Table 13. Negative interest rate period causes the coefficients to be either really low or 
statistically insignificant. This might be due to the small sample of years with negative 
interest rates combined with lagged independent variables.   
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7. DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The main interest of this study is to examine the relationship of capital structure to the 
changes in interest rate, especially the negative interest rate period in Europe. This 
chapter will wrap up the descriptive statistics and empirical results, presenting a 
comprehensive view and conclusions based on the evidence.  
 
Table 3 shows the development of debt ratios across the sample period. Overall, the 
debt ratios stay relatively constant over the period. The usual change in the ratio is only 
one percentage point. The biggest exception is in Denmark, where total debt to assets 
increase from 0,46 to 0,52 from 2007-2009 to 2010-2012. However, the median stays 
constant, which implies that there were only few companies that increased heavily their 
debt ratio during this time. The mean and median of total debt to assets is otherwise the 
same or really close to each other in the whole sample. Long-term debt to assets has 
logically smaller ratio, because it is one part of total debt. However, the median is 
consistently smaller than mean, which implies that there is a group of companies with 
distinctively higher long-term debt, which increases the average. Therefore, high long-
term leverage does not describe well the whole sample. Debt to capital ratio has in turn 
the highest ratios, because capital is a part of total assets. Here the median is actually 
higher than the mean, which implies that there is a group of firms with significantly 
lower ratios. Low debt to capital ratio indicates higher emphasis on equity financing. 
Nevertheless, these ratios are really static on average and imply static debt ratio.  
 
Table 4. suggests that there was higher emphasis on distributing wealth back to the 
shareholders than investing in the company. Investing is probably not attractive, if the 
companies do not expect sufficient demand for the products and services they invest in. 
This is hardly surprising, if assumed that one main driver of inflation is demand, given 
the fact that financial and European sovereign debt crises caused a negative shock in 
inflation (Eurostat 2016). First there were two major hits in 2008 and 2009, but then 
inflation rallied in 2010. However, after the correction, inflation has steadily declined, 
which has caused central banks to commit new monetary policy methods, such as 
quantative easing and negative interest rates in order to boost the inflation and demand. 
The rationale behind negative interest rates is to make lending more attractive for the 
retail banks, because surplus funds cause costs for them. At the same time, low rates 
should make loaning affordable for companies, thus, allowing broader set of investment 
opportunities to be possible. If this equation works, these monetary policy tools should 
increase investments and inflation.  
67 
 
 
Unfortunately, bare cost of debt is not solely dictating the investment decision. Many 
companies measure the profitability of investment using net present value (NPV), 
internal rate of return (IRR) or similar method (Graham and Harvey 2002). These 
methods use cost of capital as denominator, which is a critical factor additional to future 
cash flows. However, interest rate of debt is only a part of cost of capital. Cost of equity 
is the second piece, and the return demanded by investors drives this factor. For 
example, market values of companies, as Table 5. shows, have soared in this sample 
period along with stock indices breaking all time high records. This implies that 
investors demand high return for equity and the discount factor for investment rises 
despite of low interest rate. Also, considering the low overall demand, the potential cash 
flows of an investment can be riskier than before. When weighting always relatively 
risky investment with increased rate of return expectations of shareholders, it can be 
easier and more safe for the management to focus on methods that increase stock price 
and return of equity in relatively more secure methods. Increasing dividends and stock 
repurchases by the company does that with Tables 4 and 5 supporting this view. 
 
Regression analysis focus on testing pecking order and trade-off theories. Aggregated 
pecking order model gives statistically significant results in Table 7. It measures the 
effect of financial deficit to the change of debt. Deficit is measured by summing paid 
cash dividend and investments, change in working capital and subtracting net cash flow.   
However, the hypothesis requires the deficit variable to be close to one, which is not 
met. Disaggregated model of financial deficit, which measures the components of 
deficit individually, is created in order to justify the aggregated model. Unfortunately, 
this model gives mostly insignificant results in Table 8, which were also far from the 
unity condition. Tables 15 and 16 further strengthens these findings, and overall the 
pecking order theory cannot be accepted by these models and evidence. 
 
Leverage testing using conventional model was used to find out factors that would 
support either trade-off or pecking order hypotheses. This measured the effect of 
tangibility, market-to-book ratio, sales, profitability, deficit and interest rate on the debt. 
On the contrary to the previous tests, there were more variables that supported pecking 
order than trade-off theory. However, this conclusion cannot be accepted as the 
dedicated pecking order testing does not support it. Dynamic trade-off model gave 
results, which indicate that firms adjust to the target leverage in two years and less. This 
could explain the relatively static level of debt and that there really is a target debt ratio. 
Combining with the evidence in the conventional model and other statistics gives the 
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strongest support for trade-off theory. Robustness checks with dummy variables for 
negative interest rate period in Table 17 and 18 further confirms the results.  
 
Regressions also measured the effect of interest rate to the leverage. Table 11. shows 
that there was on average positive relationship with them between 2007-2012 and 
negative relationship in 2013-2015. An exception was Switzerland, where was negative 
relationship during the full period. Negative relationship is implicitly expected by the 
monetary policy makers, if they wanted to increase lending activity by decreasing the 
rate. However, declining interest rate with positive relationship implies that leverage 
also decreased in this time. Thus, the goal was not achieved in the first two sub periods. 
Negative relationship in 2013-2015 could be interpreted so that negative interest rate 
was the tipping point, which finally turned the relationship into the desired one. 
Furthermore, robustness checks with dummy variables for negative interest rate period 
indicate increased leverage during this period. Sadly, this cannot be claimed as causality.  
Another explanation could be increased demand, which caused firms to loan more. 
Investigating the relationship of leverage, investments and inflation would be interesting 
choice for future research. This could help in understanding the effect of inflation or 
consumption demand to corporate capital structure. If negative rates will last further 
years, future researches would give larger sample than this paper, which might give 
more robust results.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study’s regression analysis focuses on testing pecking order and trade-off theories. 
Aggregated pecking order model gives statistically significant results, but they are far 
from the required unity condition, which would validate pecking order hypothesis. 
Additionally, disaggregated model gave even more mixed results that does not support 
the theory either. Leverage testing using conventional model was used to find out 
factors that would support either trade-off or pecking order hypothesis. Surprisingly, 
there were more variables that supported pecking order than trade-off theory. However, 
this interpretation cannot be accepted as the dedicated pecking order testing does not 
support it. Dynamic trade-off model gives results, which indicate that firms adjust to the 
target leverage in two years and less. This could explain the relatively static level of 
debt and that there really is a target debt ratio. Combining with the evidence in the 
conventional model and other statistics gives the strongest support for trade-off theory. 
 
Numerous models and tables in this paper show that leverage had positive relationship 
with interest rate during the fall of the rates from 2007 to 2012, which indicates that the 
leverage ratio decreased with interest rate during this time. However, during the last 
observed period of 2013-2015, this relationship turned to the opposite. Negative and 
decreasing interest rates describe these years. Further robustness checks confirm that 
firm leverage increased during the period of negative interest rates.  
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